Recent GDPR Developments in Italy

Can we say that Italy took the new privacy rules set out in GDPR seriously?

Italian businesses have carried out many preparatory activities in view of 25 May 2018, the date of full applicability of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation No. 679/2016 (“GDPR”): a large number of privacy policies have been amended and updated, Data Protection Officers have been appointed and mailing lists have been reviewed and updated to comply with the new provisions

After the first few months with the GDPR in full force, this article takes a critical look at the current state of affairs

Although the GDPR has direct effect in Italian law and thus required no implementation, the Italian Council of Ministers approved a Legislative Decree (no. 101/2018) with the purpose of harmonizing the Italian Privacy Code (D. Lgs. n. 196/2003) with the new GDPR provisions. The Italian decree entered into force on 19 September 2018.

There are several new provisions regarding amongst others the consent of minors, which in relation to the direct offer of “information society services” must be given by those exercising parental responsibility where a child is under 14 years; the legal basis for data processing have been identified in laws and regulations as well as in “the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority”; privacy policies on the management of CVs must be provided to the candidate at the time of the “first useful contact”, after the candidate spontaneously sends the CV to a company/organization; privacy requirements for small to medium sized enterprises have been simplified; new penalties have been introduced in relation to unlawful data processing; illegal communication and disclosure of data processed on a large scale; violations of the provisions on remote controls and surveys of workers’ opinions, etc.

Moreover, based on a recent public notice from the Italian Data Protection Authority (“IDPA”), it appears that the number of complaints filed with the IDPA are up 42% since 25 May this year: more than 2.500 complaints and reports have already been filed with the IDPA compared to 1,795 received in the same period last year.

In addition, the IDPA has received more than 40,000 communications of DPO data and more than 300 cases of data breaches have been notified.

In conclusion it seems the GDPR provisions have evidently been taken very seriously by Italy becoming more and more widely applied, thus enabling more effective protection of personal data.

As all FRAND aficionados should already know, with a judgment handed down yesterday the Court of Appeal of England and Wales upheld Birss J’s first instance decision in Unwired Planet v Huawei (the appeal decision is available here, whilst Birss J’s decision is available here).

In doing so, the Court agreed with the first instance court in holding that a global SEP portfolio owner can comply with its FRAND obligations by offering a worldwide licence, whose terms can be determined by the UK Courts, and, if that offer is refused by the implementer, is entitled to an injunction covering the UK territory based on the UK SEPs in dispute in the UK national proceedings.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court agreed with Birss J’s findings that global portfolio licensing is efficient and in line with industry practice of the mobile industry, echoing the relevance given to “recognised commercial practices in the field” by the CJEU’s decision in Case C‑170/13 – Huawei (not expressly cited by the Court of Appeal in support of this finding, though).

The Court also dismissed Huawei’s appeal on the non-discrimination prong of the FRAND commitment, holding that the FRAND obligation does not amount to a “most favoured nation” approach to licensing, an approach which had been rejected by ETSI at the time it set its IP Policy. Instead, in the Court’s view, a SEP holder’s FRAND undertaking only requires it to offer licences which reflect the proper valuation of its portfolio, in a global assessment which has to consider the FRAND obligation as a whole. This, of course, does not exclude the relevance of the parallel obligations stemming out of competition law, as mandated by the CJEU in its Huawei decision (which expressly refers to “licensing agreements already concluded with other competitors” as a relevant factor “to check whether [the SEP holder’s] offer complies with the condition of non-discrimination”) or in MEO-Serviços de Comunicações e Multimédia SA v Autoridade da Concorrência. This issue, and the meaning in the context of FRAND licensing of the notion of competitive disadvantage under Article 102 TFEU, was however left unaddressed by the Court, as it only focused on the obligations not to discriminate stemming out of the FRAND commitment.

Finally, the Court confirmed Briss J’s view that the steps outlined by the CJEU’s Huawei decision only amount to a safe harbour and do not automatically trigger liability under Article 102 TFEU if not complied with by the SEP holder: whether an abuse of dominance exists is to be assessed taking all circumstances of the case into account. In the Court’s view, the only exception to this principle is to be found in the SEP holder’s obligation to alert the alleged infringer prior to file suit, as the language used by the Huawei decision on the point is clear cut and excludes interpretations that do not view this step as a compulsory pre-condition for bringing action.

In terms of next steps, the Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal to the Supreme Court and, unsurprisingly, Huawei has indicated that they intend to seek permission to appeal to the Supreme Court itself.

The decision has already received a warm welcome by SEP holders, as it opens the door to global FRAND rate setting in the framework of national infringement proceedings. It is yet to be seen, however, whether the Court’s findings will remain applicable in future cases, where the defendant timely objects to jurisdiction or applies for a stay of the FRAND related issues pending resolution of other preliminary issues to be decided in foreign, more convenient, fora . These steps were indeed not taken by Huawei and it is also on this basis that the Court of Appeal dismissed Huawei’s jurisdictional challenges (see [112]). Also, should these jurisdictional issues be overcome in future cases (such as in the pending Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE appeal, where some of these issues are currenly being discussed), one is left wondering whether the current praise might soon be reconsidered, as the approach of the UK Courts is progressively adopted by jurisdictions where SEP holders might be less inclined to litigate matters such as the global FRAND rate for their entire SEP portfolios.

Also, there is one passage of the decision of the Court which is difficult to reconcile with the CJEU’s Huawei decision and the general consensus on the contents of the FRAND obligations of SEP holders. The Court of Appeal indeed disagreed with Briss J that there is only one set of FRAND terms for any given set of circumstances. In the Court’s view, it is perfectly possible that there is more than one set of FRAND terms. The Court then went on arguing that if both the SEP holder’s and the implementer’s offers are found to be FRAND, it is the offer of the SEP holder that should prevail and should be accepted by the licensee. With the words of the Court, if both the (global) license offered by SEP holder and the (national) license offered by the implementer were FRAND, “the global licence would, on this hypothesis, be fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. It would then be a matter for the prospective licensee whether to accept it”. This of course implies that, in the Court’s view, the SEP holder would be entitled to injunctive relief against a willing licensee, i.e. against an implementer willing to take a license on terms which, even if diverging from the equally FRAND terms requested by the SEP holder, were nonetheless found to be FRAND by the Court. This is obviously a conclusion hard to agree with, which is probably the result of the fact that the point was addressed only in obiter in the decision, given that the Court had previously found that Huawei’s offer limited to the UK patents was not FRAND.

The decision also includes additional interesting findings on a variety of aspects (from the presumption of dominance conferred by SEPs, to the, partially unsatisfactory, attempt to reconcile its findings on non-discrimination with the US and German precedents on the point). We will cover them all very soon.

As the proposed “Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market” suffers a halt with the European Parliament declining to vote and rescheduling approval for September 2018, one of the main stumbling blocks is the likely ‘invasive’ nature Art. 13 requiring Internet Service Providers to pre-emptively scan, filter and block copyright-infringing contents which many in the industry consider too onerous.  A recent ruling by the Court of Milan, once again, had to tackle the tricky and difficult issue of the extent the ISP’s liability, determining the scope of the injunction against ISP. In particular, the Court of Milan ruled on the admissibility of a Preliminary Injunction order issued against network access providers that extends not only to the domain name whose content has been found to be illegal, but also to all the different domains that provide the same content to the public (the so-called “alias” sites). The IP Milan Chamber found that such a ruling is compatible with the general prohibition according to which ISPs do not have a surveillance obligation, challenged at the EU level, and at the same time complies with the principles of proportionality, effectiveness and dissuasiveness of PI measures.

Following the PI proceedings brought by Arnoldo Mondadori S.p.A., the Court of Milan, on 12 April 2018, ordered Fastweb S.p.A., Telecom Italia S.p.A., Tiscali Italia S.p.A., Vodafone Italia S.p.A. and Wind Tre S.p.A., in their role as network access providers,  to pay the costs for the implementation of the most appropriate technical measures that prevent users from accessing a portal that provided complete versions of Mondadori’s publications, either through the domain name “Italiashare.net” – the content of which was deemed unlawful – or through the “alias” sites, accessible through any domain name.

The case stemmed from an initial PI appeal brought by Mondadori against the same network access providers, as well as the hosting company, to obtain an order preventing access to the “Dasolo” portal by the recipients of the services, regardless of the top level domain adopted (“.it”, “.org”, “.net”). “Dasolo” illegally catalogued and provided the users with full versions of numerous magazines published by Mondadori (among many, “Chi”, “Cucina Moderna”, “Donna Moderna”, “Grazia”, “Panorama”, “Sale & Pepe”).

After having examined and distinguished the different liability profiles of the providers that perform data transport functions (the so-called “mere conduits”) and of those that store contents (the so-called “hosting” activity), the Judge for the first PI proceedings ordered the service providers to disable access “to all the sites with second-level domain name ‘dasolo’ regardless of the top level domain adopted” (“a tutti i siti con nome di dominio di secondo livello ‘dasolo’ indipendentemente dal top level domain adottato”, Milan Court, ord. 24 July 2017).

However, this measure did not prove to be sufficiently effective, since in a short time the “Dasolo” portal had become operational again by changing its second-level domain to “Italiashare”, while continuing to publish the same illegal content.

Therefore, Mondadori requested out-of-court that the network access providers adopt all the technical measures necessary to also disable this new domain. The providers refused on the grounds that a specific judicial or administrative measure would be necessary to extend the injunction to the different second-level domain “Italiashare”. Hence Mondadori’s new PI motion was aimed at obtaining a more far-reaching injunction, which could be extended to all different second-level domains that provide the same illegal content to the public (the so-called “alias” sites).

This is the framework for the recent order which is examined here. In fact, the Milan Court clarified that such an order is compatible with the fact that ISPs do not have a preventive surveillance obligation, since they are not subject to any general obligation to monitor the network, since their intervention is always subject to specific notification by the right holder.

The Directive on electronic commerce only prohibits the imposition on ISPs of a general duty of preventive surveillance, and conversely requires them to implement effective measures for both repression and prevention of offences, using the detailed reports of the right holders, who are therefore reserved a proactive role in the protection of their rights. The First Instance Court further observes that the prohibition of a general obligation to monitor is not in any event of exempting effect here, since the electronic commerce Directive provides that “this does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case” (DIRECTIVE 2000/31/EC, Whereas No. 47).

Such an order was also considered to be both effective and proportionate. The principle of the proportionality of PI measures must always be balanced with the principle of the effectiveness of copyright protection, which requires the court to take all appropriate measures to prevent the recurrence of unlawful acts since, if, for any infringement subsequently found, the intervention of the court was necessary “no injunction could ever be issued for the future, contradicting the very nature of this type of conviction, ontologically projected to prevent the continuation and repetition of the offences to come”.

It is in this perspective that the Court of Justice has in fact ruled that injunction orders “must be sufficiently effective to ensure genuine protection of the fundamental right at issue,” that is to say “they must have the effect of preventing unauthorised access to the protected subject-matter or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve” (CJEU, 27 March 2014, in Case C-314/12, Telekabel).

The Court further observes that the admissibility of the so-called “Dynamic Injunction“, i.e. orders which also extend to sites not expressly indicated in the PI order and which therefore overcome the inconvenience of having to establish subsequent judgements to strike and pursue phenomenologically identical violations, has also been confirmed by the European Commission, when interpreting the Enforcement Directive.

The Court therefore concludes the order by requiring the Respondents, in their capacity as network access providers, take the most appropriate technical measures to prevent the recipients of their services from gaining access to the portals which provide the public with the same illegal content as that at issue in the proceedings and relating to the Magazines, either through the domain name “Italiashare.net” or through the “alias” sites, reachable through any domain name, within a maximum of ten working days of receipt of specific notification of violations reported by the applicant, with the right of the recipients of the request to reimbursement of technical costs strictly necessary and inherent to the request itself.

A positive injunction, supported by a penalty that requires ISPs to take all necessary measures to prevent access to all future alias sites that make the same illegal content available to the public and regardless of the first or second level domain actually adopted, is certainly a far-reaching order, but one that poses many implementation issues.

With particular reference to the implementation of the order, the Court of Milan, in the well-known Mediaset Premium case decided by the Court of Milan, had instead refused to extend the order to alias sites that did not yet exist, even if their content was identical, since this would have required a private party to check whether the content was lawful or not, whereas “the current legal system does not seem to allow a private party to be given the status of a body permanently delegated by the judge to fill in the preceptive content of a measure of its own” (Court of Milan, order  27 July 2016, Mediaset Premium).

The order under review seems to go beyond the conclusions of the previous Mediaset Premium in favour of a more effective protection for right holders, which is certainly desirable, following the most recent and extensive interpretation of Community case-law on the liability of intermediaries, while at the same time denoting the growing attention of national courts to the need for right holders to obtain effective measures to combat online piracy.

However, there remain the problems that the previous Mediaset case had reported with regard to the methods of execution of the PI order, since the positive order commented herein shifts the assessment of illegality to a private level, leaving it in fact to the agreement or unity of views on the illegality of the content between the holder of rights and the ISP, relegating the intervention of the judge at the time of non-compliance by the ISP to the request for disabling the alias.

With a judgement dated 26 April 2018, the General Court of the EU held that the famous Argentinian football player – and multiple Ballon d’Or winner,  Lionel Andrès Messi, could  register his mark ‘MESSI’ for sports and gymnastics clothing, footwear and equipment notwithstanding the opposition by the owner of a highly similar earlier sign “MASSI” registered  for similar goods. The trade mark applied for is represented below:

This matter commenced back in November 2011 when Mr Messi’s trademark was opposed by Mr. Jaime Masferrer Coma who had an earlier trade mark registration for clothing, shoes and bicycle helmets, protective clothing and gloves.  The Opposition Division upheld the opposition against Mr. Messi’s application on the basis of the similarity of the signs ‘MESSI’ and ‘MASSI’ and the similarity and identical nature of the goods.  Mr. Messi lodged an appeal to the Board of Appeal of the EUIPO against this initial decision but the appeal was dismissed in 2014.

According to the Board of Appeal, there would be a likelihood of confusion between the two trade marks in view of the high similarity of the signs and of the goods covered (in particular, sports equipment and clothing, though not limited to the field of football).  The Board of Appeal held that there was a likelihood of confusion because of the similarity between the dominant elements of the two marks which are almost identical visually and phonetically. Regarding the conceptual differences arising due to the fame of Mr. Messi, the Board of Appeal considered that this differentiation would only be perceived by the football and sport lovers ie: only by a part of the relevant public and not by the whole of the relevant public, and that this was not sufficient to result in a risk of confusion for the public.

The Sixth Chamber of the General Court, led by the Italian President, Judge Rapporteur Mr. Berardis, took a different view. The EU judges did not question the findings of the Board of Appeal concerning the visual and phonetic similarity of the signs, but they did challenge the assessment of the conceptual similarity and the resulting assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the two signs.

According to the General Court decision, Mr. Messi is a public personality well-known to the vast majority of the public. The average consumer “reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect” when purchasing sport-related (but not just football-related) clothing and accessories could only but associate the sign “MESSI” with the famous football player. Although it would be true that not all the public would know the details regarding his career and achievements, the General Court thought it highly unlikely that a part of the public would have never heard of him or know who he is.

The General Court considered that the fame of Mr. Messi did not need to be further demonstrated by the applicant with documentary evidence – which had not been done in a timely fashion during the administrative phase of proceedings before the EUIPO – as – according to the General Court – Messi’s name is so well known, that there is no need for further proof. Such fact could have been known and thus taken into account by the Board of Appeal when reaching its decision, thus it did not need to be invoked or supported by evidence by any of the parties even in the administrative phase.

The General Court concluded that the conceptual differences between the signs, linked to the fame of Mr. Messi, are so striking that they are able to neutralise the visual and phonetic similarities between the signs at issue. Thus, it affirmed that the Board of Appeal erred in considering that there was a likelihood of confusion and it annulled the decision of the EUIPO.

The Spanish company, JM-EV e hijos, current owner of the sign “MASSI” has two months to decide whether to bring an appeal against this judgement, limited to the points of law, before the Court of Justice.

This judgement recalls the “PICASSO” case (T-185/02 and appeal C-361/04 P) where the reference to the famous painter (whose heirs, who had licensed the use of the name to the car manufacturer Citroën, were the opponents), due to his fame, ruled out any conceptual similarity with respect to the contested DaimlerChrysler’s trade mark application “PICARO”, both covering similar goods which had nothing to do with art painting, namely motor vehicles.

Hence, according to the EU case law in question, famous persons’ names as trademarks seem to be double edged weapons when it comes to the likelihood of confusion test. On the one hand they can be very resistant to oppositions like in the recent “MESSI” case, but also, on the other hand, oppositions having famous persons’ names as their basis are not able to impede similar signs to be later registered, as in the “PICASSO” case.

It will be interesting to see how famous personalities will actually ride the wave of this EU case law – and whether an appeal is filed.

 

 

Benedetta Marsicola

A landmark decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued on 6 December 2017 confirmed that a supplier of luxury goods may prohibit authorised retailers part of a selective distribution system from selling its products on third party e-commerce platforms.[1]

In the case at issue the request for a preliminary ruling was submitted by the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main (Higher Regional Court, Frankfurt am Main) in 2016 in the context of a dispute between Coty Germany GmbH, a supplier of luxury cosmetics established in Germany, and Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, an authorised distributor of those goods, concerning the prohibition, under a selective distribution contract between Coty Germany and its authorised distributors, of the use by the latter, in a discernible manner, of third-party undertakings for internet sales of the contract goods.

Specifically, Coty Germany brought an action before the national court seeking an order prohibiting Parfümerie Akzente from distributing products via the platform ‘amazon.de’.

The Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, also in view of the divergent interpretations of the earlier ECJ’s Pierre Fabre decision issued in 2011[2], by the courts and competition authorities of the Member States   decided to stay the proceedings and to refer to the European Court of Justice questions concerning whether a selective distribution system that has as its aim the distribution of luxury goods constitutes an aspect of competition that is compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU and, specifically, whether the general prohibition imposed on members of a selective distribution system to use, in a discernible manner, for internet sales, e-commerce platforms of third-party companies, is compatible with that rule.

In its ruling the ECJ’s, referring to its settled case-law, stated first of all that a selective distribution system for luxury goods designed primarily to preserve the luxury image of those goods does not breach the prohibition of agreements, decisions and concerted practices laid down in EU law, provided that the resellers are chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature, which are laid down uniformly and are not applied in a discriminatory fashion, nor go beyond what is necessary.

The Court then found that EU law does not preclude a contractual clause which prohibits authorised distributors of a selective distribution network of luxury goods from using, in a discernible manner, third-party platforms for internet sales of the goods in question, provided that the clause is appropriate to preserving the luxury image of the goods, it is laid down uniformly, not applied in discriminatory manner and is proportionate in the light of the objective pursued.

The ECJ further noted that, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, these conditions are met and therefore prohibition of the use, in a discernible manner, of third-party undertakings for internet sales does not constitute a restriction of customers nor a restriction of passive sales to end users. Such latter restrictions are automatically excluded from the benefit of a block exemption because they are liable to have severely anticompetitive effects.

1. Selective distribution system: general remarks

The adoption of a selective distribution system for companies operating in the field of luxury and fashion is one of the key factors in the process of evaluation, which allows the trademark owner to protect the prestige and renown of its brand and to guarantee the quality of the products to be distinguished, from the time of the product ideation to its delivery to the final user.

Article 1, let. e) of  Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 broadly defines it as a distribution system where the supplier undertakes to sell the contract goods or services, either directly or indirectly, only to distributors selected on the basis of specified criteria and where these distributors undertake not to sell such goods or services to unauthorised distributors within the territory reserved by the supplier to operate that system.

Therefore, the ban on the resale of products to subjects other than end consumers, unrelated to the network established by the manufacturer, is therefore the “heart” of selective distribution, because through it the goods bearing the trademark are marketed exclusively through retailers who meet certain standards of professional competence, which allows the manufacturer to guarantee uniformity of service at points of sale, coordinated management of logistics, training of personnel specialized in the sale of prestigious products and the control of the disposal of unsold products.

The products subject to selective distribution are usually high-class goods with a high symbolic value, bearing trademarks which convey a message of exclusivity, which can be jeopardized even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.

Selective distribution systems are therefore justified not only in the interests of the trademark owner to consolidate its brand awareness and to preserve around its own products an aura of luxury which enables consumers to distinguish them from similar goods, but also in the interest of the consumers to be guaranteed a high level of quality of service, in line with the standard set by the manufacturer.[3]

These principles have been applied and confirmed by the European Court of Justice in the Coty case, where the Court noted that the quality of luxury goods is not simply the result of their material characteristics, but also of the allure and prestigious image which bestows on them an aura of luxury.

These aspects, the ECJ further noted, are essential for luxury goods since they enable consumers to distinguish them from other similar goods. Therefore any impairment to that aura of luxury is likely to affect their actual quality.

2. Selective distribution and trademark exhaustion

The success of this kind of distribution system cannot, in any case, be independent of effective control by the trademark owner.

The development of the free riding phenomenon in the context of a selective distribution system lies in the fact that third party resellers, not belonging to the system, appear on the market as apparent authorized retailers generating in consumers the belief that the reseller belongs to the selective distribution network arranged by the trademark owner.

In recent years this phenomenon has been the subject of a wide debate amongst scholars and case-law, often with opposing positions on the interpretation of trademark exhaustion doctrine and unfair competition by the unauthorized reseller.

Article 5 of the Italian IP Code (likewise Article 15 of the EU Directive No. 2015/2436) provides that the exclusive rights of the trademark’s owner “are exhausted once the products protected by an industrial property right have been put on the market by the owner or with his consent in the territory of the Country or in the territory of a Member State of the European Union or the European Economic Area”. Paragraph 2 further specifies that “This limitation on the powers of the owner does not however apply when there are legitimate reasons for the owner himself to oppose further marketing of the goods, in particular when the condition of the same has been modified or altered after being put on the market”.

In this regard, the ECJ settled case law clearly states that the existence of a selective distribution agreement is one of the “legitimate reasons” which excludes the application of the exhaustion doctrine of the trademark after the goods have been put on the market, pursuant to Art. 7 No. 2 of Directive 2008/95/C.E. (now, Article 15 EU Directive No. 2015/2436).

Applying these principles, the ECJ clarifies that what is important for the exclusion of the exhaustion doctrine is the confusing effect of the existence of a commercial link between the unauthorized reseller and the trademark’s owner which jeopardizes, or potentially jeopardizes, the aura of luxury and prestige that the trademark’s owner tries to preserve through the adoption of a selective distribution system.

Leading scholarly literature and settled case law have often acknowledged that also the use of false capacity, i.e. pretending to be an authorized reseller which is part of the selective distribution system implemented by the trademark owner, might amount to trademark infringement.[4]

In this regard, the Court of Catania, in a recent ruling issued on 29 November 2016 in proceedings brought by the fashion company Bulgari against an unauthorized reseller, acknowledged that the use of the brand “BVLGARI” on the unauthorized reseller’s web site in order to advertise the sale of Bulgari’s products generated the belief in the public that reseller was part of Bulgari’s distribution network.[5]

The Court further stated that the burden of proof of the existence of “legitimate reasons” pursuant to Art. 15 EU Directive No. 2015/2436 had been fulfilled by the trademark owner since Bulgari was able to prove:

1 – The implementation of a selective distribution system, based on contractual clauses to impose precise quality standards on distributors;

2 – That the goods at issue were luxury or prestige items;

3 – That the sale of Bulgari’s product by an unauthorized reseller, for its specific methods which were not in accordance with the well-known trademark’s owner standards, resulted in an actual prejudice to the prestigious and exclusive image of Bulgari, not respecting any of the quality standards imposed on authorized resellers.[6]

 3. Violation of a selective distribution system and unfair competition

Italian case law also analysed a further aspect concerning the role of the third party unauthorized reseller in the context of a selective distribution system, i.e. whether inducing an authorized dealer to violate its contractual obligations may amount to a violation of the selective distribution system and therefore a breach of contractual obligations.

Selective distribution agreement is legally binding only between the parties. Therefore, the ban on the resale of products to subjects unrelated to the network established by the manufacturer, other than end consumers, is not binding to third parties, such as the unauthorized reseller.

In the past decade, Italian case law often held the view that the unauthorized reseller is always free to buy the goods intended for selective distribution, pursuant to the constitutional freedom of the enterprise. The violation of a selective distribution system by those who are not contractually bound by such a system does not amount to unfair competition, since the obligations between the manufacturer and its authorized dealer are not binding for the third party.[7]

In this regard, a landmark case of the Court of Palermo, following a more recent trend[8], acknowledged that the interference of a third party with a selective distribution system may amount to an act of unfair competition such as “involving in another’s breach of obligations”, which has to be considered an independent act of unfair competition prohibited pursuant to Art. 2598, No. 3 Italian Civil Code.[9]

If the selective distribution network is legitimately created by the trademark’s owner, in compliance with the antitrust regulations, the acts of third parties not belonging to the network consisting in selling (despite having been made aware of the existence of the selective distribution system) products bearing that mark may be considered acts of unfair competition.

Specifically, the Court noted that there may be unfair competition exclusively in the case whether the unauthorized reseller is aware, or has been made aware, of the existence of a selective distribution agreement. Therefore, “once he receives such communication it is no longer a question of irrelevance due to the relativity of obligations principle exclusively between the manufacturer and the distributer” and then “continuing to sell trademarked products even after the manufacturer has notified that a selective distribution system was implemented amounts to unfair competition”.

4. Practical implications

The above mentioned cases deal with different aspects related to the same issue: enforcing trademark rights in the context of a selective distribution strategy in the luxury field in order to protect brand owners against different forms of free riding.

These rulings provide helpful guidance for companies in the luxury field as to what is permissible and can be done to enforce selective distribution against distributors in breach of their contractual obligations and unauthorized resellers.

In conclusion some basic guidelines in this area of luxury goods are:

1. the selective distribution system implemented by the trademark owner to distribute luxury goods must be based on contractual clauses which impose precise quality standards on distributors, i.e. it must be compliant with the antitrust regulations,

2. it is essential to prove that  the products in questions are luxury items and that the selective distribution system is necessary to protect their luxury image,

3. the restrictions imposed on distributors must be consistent with the aim of protecting that luxury image, they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner and should not go beyond what is necessary.

4. the requirements of the selective distribution system need to be regularly assessed by the brand owner to guarantee they remain fit for purpose,

5. restrictions on sales on third-party platforms, such as Amazon or Ebay, to protect a luxury image are allowed only provided that this does not give rise to a total prohibition on online sales,

6. beside trademark infringement, in order to prove unfair competition by the unauthorized reseller for interfering in the selective distribution agreement, i.e. involvement in another’s breach of obligation, it is necessary to prove awareness on the part of the unauthorized distributor of the existence of a selective distribution agreement between the trademark’s owner and its reseller.

coty.jpg

[1] ECJ, 6 December 2017, C‑230/16, “Coty”.

[2] ECJ, 13 October 2011, C-439/09, “Pierre Fabre”, which, purely for the goods at issue in that case, stated that the need to preserve the prestigious image of cosmetic and body hygiene goods was not a legitimate requirement for the purpose of justifying a comprehensive prohibition of the internet sale of those goods.

[3] See ECJ, 23 April 2009, C-59/08, “Copad”, which stated that “the quality of luxury goods…is not just the result of their material characteristics, but also of the allure and prestigious image which bestows on them an aura of luxury. Since luxury goods are high-class goods, the aura of luxury emanating from them is essential in that it enables consumers to distinguish them from similar goods. Therefore, an impairment to that aura of luxury is likely to affect the actual quality of those goods. Given that context, it must next be examined whether, in the case in the main proceedings, the sale by the licensee of luxury goods to discount stores which are not part of the selective distribution network set up under the licence agreement, may constitute such impairment…Setting up a selective distribution system such as that at issue in the main proceedings which, according to the terms of the licence agreement between Dior and SIL, seeks to ensure that the goods are displayed in sales outlets in a manner that enhances their value, ‘especially as regards the positioning, advertising, packaging as well as business policy’, contributes… to the reputation of the goods at issue and therefore to sustaining the aura of luxury surrounding them”.

[4]  Please see, amongst others, Court of Rome, 28 April 2004, which granted to Jaguar urgency measures against an unauthorized reseller using its distinctive trademark, stating that “the use of a service mark, if carried out in such a way as to appear to consumers as an indicative sign of the third party’s affiliation to the service network of the trade mark owner, constitutes trademark infringement, since the public falls into error about the inclusion of the retailer in the sales network of the trademark owner”.

[5]  Court of Catania, 29 November 2016.  See also Galli, Bulgari successfully enforces selective distribution network against former distributor, WTR, 27 March 2017.

[6] Specifically, the Court found that there was no assortment of products, nor adequate display stands and the unauthorised reseller was applying excessively high discounts, which were not in keeping with Bulgari’s standards.

[7] Court of Venice, 10 March 2004; Court of Milan, 8 March 2004; Court of Bari, 11 July 2008.

[8] See also Court of Milan, 13 March 2009, which stated that “The entrepreneur who, having been aware of the existence of a selective distribution network for products of a certain brand, since he was specifically excluded, and he led the consumers to believe is an authorized distributor of those products violates unfair competition law”.

[9] Court of Palermo, 28 February 2013, which stated that the unauthorized seller of Thun’s products, the well-known manufacturer of artistic ceramics, was aware of the implementation of a selective distribution network since he has been notified by the trademark owner through a letter prior to the preliminary injunction proceedings.

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“Every transmission or retransmission of a work which uses a specific technical means must, as a rule, be individually authorised by the author of the work in question”.

This is one the main principles ensuing from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the its recent decision of 29 November 2017 (Case C-265/16).

Continue Reading CJEU on VCAST Recording Service: is a Different Means of Transmission an Essential Condition for the Existence of a New Communication to the Public?

The CJEU has just confirmed that the concerted provision of misleading information about product safety can constitute a restriction by object under Article 101(1) TFEU, when it is intended to reduce the competitive pressure resulting from an alternative medicinal product (Case C-179/16, F. Hoffmann-La Roche and Others v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato).

Continue Reading Breaking news: CJEU ruling in Hoffmann-La Roche published on 23 January

Impero Uomo.JPGThe legal principle that minor differences to a weak mark can have a significant impact on the likelihood of a finding of no confusion was reaffirmed with a recent decision by the First Section of the Italian Supreme Court (Order No. 28818/2017).

Continue Reading The Likelihood of confusion: Even descriptive elements can exclude confusion for Weak Trademarks.

music-score-notes.jpgBy adopting Legislative Decree no. 35 of 15 March 2017 (Decree 35/2017) Italy implemented EU Directive 2014/26 on collective management of copyright and related rights.

The Directive and Decree 35/2017 identify two kind of entities which may be entrusted with the management of copyright and related rights: (i) collective management organisations and (ii) independent management entities.

Collective management organisations are owned/controlled by their members and/or are organised on a not-for-profit basis, while independent management entities are neither owned nor controlled by rightholders and are organised on a for-profit basis.

Continue Reading An Update on the (Partial) Liberalization of Copyright Collective Management in Italy

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On 29 November Italy’s Antitrust Authority launched non-compliance proceedings against Ryanair, the Irish air line for alleged unfair commercial practices and breach of the Italian Consumer Code.

Following the spate of flight cancellations, on 25 October the Rome Administrative Court (TAR), ordered Ryanair to provide information to its passengers  – either through easily accessible procedures on the home page of its website  or  by standard email or by sms  – on how they could receive reimbursement, change the flights to alternative flights and receive other compensation. The cancelled flights occurred between 10 September –2 October and Ryanair was given a 10 day deadline to rectify the positon and ordered to provide a full written report to the court setting out details of all cancelled flights, to make the necessary information updates to its website and to inform all customers of their respective compensation rights.  Ryanair filed a brief to suspend the order but this was rejected and Ryanair failed to comply with the court order.

The Antitrust Authority in initiating its investigations for non-compliance of a court order will look into the reasons for the cancellation of numerous flights which had been booked and paid for. It will examine whether these were indeed not due to unforeseen circumstances nor to technical operational matters nor due to other reasons outside the control of the airline as well as examining whether the information was conveyed to passengers in a professional manner:  Ryanair risks  monetary sanctions of up to  Euro 5 million for the said breaches.

The Irish airline has 30 days to file defence briefs and documentation in its defence. A decision of the Antitrust Authority will be issued within 120 days.