Milan, IT- Local Division (here)

The order (available here) was issued in the context of merit proceedings brought against Alpinestars by Dainese for infringement of patents EP 4 072 364 and EP 3 498 117, the former of which is also in force in Spain. Following a preliminary objection raised by Alpinestars, the Milan LD dismissed the application asserting its jurisdiction to rule over the alleged infringement taking place outside UPC territory (in the case at issue: in Spain).

In taking this decision, the Milan LD took into account both the recent CJEU decision in BSH v. Electrolux (Case C-339/22, available here) and the existing body of UPC case law on long-arm jurisdiction of the UPC (cf. Düsseldorf LD decision in Fujifilm v Kodak, issued before BSH, available here; and the Paris LD order in Mul-T-Lock v IMC, issued after BSH, available here).

Specifically, Judge Zana stated that “the UPC, deemed to be a court of a Member State, in case it is the Court of the domicile of the defendant, has jurisdiction to adjudicate on infringement issues related to European patents validated in non-UPC Countries (so called long jurisdiction)”, adding that “in case a defendant is domiciled in Italy, the Milan Local Division jurisdiction is “universal”” (cf. paragraphs 12-13 of the order).

So far the Court of Appeal has yet to issue a conclusive decision on the point.

Introduzione

Dall’analisi dei provvedimenti assunti nel 2024 dagli organi dell’Istituto di Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria notiamo una preponderanza di ingiunzioni e provvedimenti basati sulla violazione degli articoli 23 e 23bis del Codice di Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria della Comunicazione commerciale (“CAP”), che individuano le regole per una corretta diffusione dei messaggi pubblicitari rispettivamente in tema di “Prodotti cosmetici e per l’igiene personale” e di “Integratori alimentari e prodotti dietetici”. In relazione a tali categorie di prodotto, il principio base della normativa pubblicitaria è rappresentato dalla necessità di evitare qualsiasi possibile confusione da parte del pubblico in merito alle proprietà e/o agli effetti di integratori alimentari e dei cosmetici, che non devono in alcun modo essere assimilati o assimilabili a quelli di prodotti medicinali.

Provvedimenti in tema di prodotti cosmetici e per l’igiene personale

Nello specifico, l’articolo 23 CAP prescrive che la comunicazione commerciale relativa ai prodotti cosmetici e per l’igiene personale debba essere tale da non indurre i consumatori a confondere detti prodotti con medicinali, presìdi medico-chirurgici, dispositivi medici e trattamenti curativi, né a ritenere che essi abbiano caratteristiche, proprietà e funzioni diverse da quella di essere applicati sulle superfici esterne del corpo umano, sui denti e sulle mucose della bocca, allo scopo esclusivo o prevalente di pulirli, profumarli, modificarne l’aspetto, proteggerli, mantenerli in buono stato e correggere gli odori corporei. In altre parole, dev’essere evitata la costruzione intorno al prodotto cosmetico di una c.d. “aura medicale” che possa determinare un rischio di associazione tra il prodotto e gli ambienti sanitari[1].

In linea con tale previsione, il Comitato di Controllo si è espresso in merito all’ingannevolezza di due diversi messaggi pubblicitari relativi rispettivamente ad un doccia-shampoo presentato come avente azione antibatterica e antifungina[2] e ad una crema avente un’asserita efficacia terapeutica nel trattamento della dermatite[3]. In entrambi i casi, a detta dell’organo, la costruzione del messaggio era tale da indurre il pubblico in errore sulle caratteristiche e gli effetti del prodotto pubblicizzato, in quanto l’esplicita promessa di un’azione antibatterica e antifungina, nel primo caso, o antiinfiammatoria in relazione ad una situazione patologica, nel secondo, attribuiva al prodotto un’efficacia che lo accreditava impropriamente alla stregua di un trattamento farmacologico, trascendendo appunto gli effetti riferibili invece ad un cosmetico.

Ciò detto, non si può tuttavia negare che determinati prodotti cosmetici e per l’igiene personale possano avere caratteristiche sussidiarie per la prevenzione di particolari situazioni patologiche. Ciò è esplicitamente riconosciuto dallo stesso articolo 23 CAP, che ammette la liceità di comunicazioni commerciali che mettono in risalto tali caratteristiche, sempre che i prodotti in questione effettivamente impieghino formule e ingredienti specifici riferibili allo scopo dichiarato.

Provvedimenti in tema di integratori alimentari e prodotti dietetici

Parallelamente, in tema di integratori alimentari e prodotti dietetici (anche per la prima infanzia), l’articolo 23bis CAP stabilisce che la relativa comunicazione commerciale non debba vantare proprietà non conformi alle particolari caratteristiche dei prodotti o da essi non realmente possedute, né indurre i consumatori in errori nutrizionali, ed evitare in ogni caso richiami a raccomandazioni o attestazioni di tipo medico.

Sulla scorta di ciò, è stato ritenuto contrario (anche) all’art. 23bis CAP un messaggio pubblicitario volto a promuovere un integratore alimentare attribuendogli un’efficacia di rafforzamento del sistema vascolare e di miglioramento della circolazione, e dunque un’efficacia trascendente gli effetti riconoscibili agli integratori, i quali possono “unicamente limitarsi a mantenere in buono stato una situazione di partenza sana, non potendo costituire in alcun modo un intervento di rafforzamento o miglioramento[4]. In tale occasione, il Comitato di Controllo ha altresì ribadito che la valutazione circa l’ingannevolezza di un messaggio pubblicitario deve tenere conto non soltanto del contenuto del messaggio in sé, ma anche del pubblico cui esso è destinato “costituito da persone particolarmente sensibili e per questo motivo portate ad una decodifica più allettante ed illusoria delle promesse del facile ottenimento di risultati particolarmente ambiti (quali quelli in campo salutistico), con la conseguente amplificazione dei profili di ingannevolezza[5].

In un altro caso recente, il Giurì di Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria ha ordinato la cessazione di una comunicazione commerciale concernente un integratore alimentare a base di collagene, rilevando come l’inserzionista non avesse assolto l’onere di dimostrare l’effettiva sussistenza dei pregi ascritti all’integratore oggetto del messaggio, essendosi limitato ad allegare uno studio scientifico non ancora pubblicato e in realtà nemmeno concluso[6]. In tale sede, il Giurì ha chiarito che per un effettivo assolvimento dell’onere probatorio di dimostrare la verità del messaggio pubblicitario (ex art. 6 CAP) è necessaria la presentazione di evidenze basate su studi interamente compiuti e pronti per essere sottoposti all’esame della comunità scientifica e che, al contrario, uno studio in fieri non può rappresentare un’idonea fonte di prova. Il Giurì ha altresì posto l’accento sul ruolo dell’Autorità Europea per la Sicurezza Alimentare (“EFSA”) nella verifica di attendibilità ed innocuità degli integratori alimentari, sottolineando che la principale modalità per gli inserzionisti di assolvere al suddetto onere probatorio coincide proprio con l’approvazione degli integratori pubblicizzati da parte dell’EFSA.

Una disciplina specifica è poi individuata per i messaggi pubblicitari aventi ad oggetto gli integratori alimentari per il controllo o la riduzione del peso, per i quali  il Regolamento sulla comunicazione commerciale degli integratori alimentari, oltre a vietare la rivendicazione di vantaggi non veritieri o non dimostrati o riferirsi ad approvazioni o avalli scientifici, stabilisce anche che il messaggio pubblicitario non possa presentare i prodotti in questione come “dimagranti”, potendo essi svolgere al massimo una generica azione coadiuvante nell’ambito di diete ipocaloriche, e vieta l’esplicita menzione di condizioni di peso “ideale” o di quantificazioni assolute dei risultati ottenibili in un determinato periodo di tempo, come anche l’enfasi del concetto di dimagrimento come sinonimo di salute. Circa la possibilità di richiamare test o studi scientifici a corredo delle affermazioni contenute nell’annuncio, il Regolamento ammette la citazione circostanziata e veritiera dei risultati specifici di test di tollerabilità o di efficacia effettuati sui prodotti pubblicizzati, a condizione che si tratti di test effettuati secondo criteri e metodologie accettati dalla comunità scientifica. Al contrario, non è consentito l’uso di espressioni quali “clinicamente testato”, oppure “test clinici dimostrano che…”. Alla stregua di tali principi, sono stati ritenuti non conformi messaggi pubblicitari che rivendicavano un’efficacia degli integratori alimentari pubblicizzati su punti localizzati del corpo (ad esempio, su “girovita, addome”, “pancia” e “fianchi[7]), anche mediante l’impiego di espressioni come “Efficacia testata”, “funzionalità dimostrata da test clinico[8], riportando invece le informazioni essenziali sulla reale natura del prodotto e della sua funzionalità a caratteri minimi in calce al messaggio.

Conclusioni

Ciò detto, è riscontrabile un’importante contrazione del numero dei provvedimenti negativi assunti dagli organi dell’Istituto di Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria nel corso dell’ultimo ventennio. Questa tendenza potrebbe ascriversi ad una maggiore attenzione degli operatori economici nei confronti della normativa di settore. Parimenti, nell’analisi del trend considerato non può trascurarsi la maggiore sensibilità dello stesso consumatore nei confronti del messaggio pubblicitario: la veridicità del claim, la sua oggettiva verificabilità e più in generale la trasparenza nella comunicazione d’impresa sono elementi centrali nella scelta d’acquisto da parte dell’utilizzatore finale, traducendosi dunque in elementi premiali e di accreditamento sul mercato non più trascurabili dalle imprese ai fini della loro competitività.


[1] cfr. Giurì di Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria, pronuncia n. 25/2024, 19 settembre 2024, Beiersdorf S.p.A. c. L’Oréal Italia S.p.A., par. 47.

[2] cfr. ingiunzione n. 15/24 del 10 giugno 2024.

[3] cfr. ingiunzione n. 13/24 del 30 maggio 2024.

[4] cit. ingiunzione n. 35/24 del 13 novembre 2024.

[5] cit. ingiunzione n. 35/24 del 13 novembre 2024; cfr. anche ingiunzione n. 17/24 del 19 giugno 2024.

[6] cfr. pronuncia n. 24/2024, 11 ottobre 2024, Comitato di Controllo c. Biostile et al.

[7] cfr. ingiunzioni n. 11/24 del 28 maggio 2024 e n. 19/24 del 5 luglio 2024.

[8] cfr. ancora ingiunzione n. 11/24 del 28 maggio 2024.

https://link.epo.org/web/about-us/statistics/en-patent-index-2024-at-a-glance.pdf

L’Ufficio Europeo dei Brevetti (European Patent Office – EPO) ha pubblicato il Patent Index 2024, che analizza l’andamento nel corso dell’ultimo anno delle domande di brevetto presentate nell’Unione Europea.

Il numero di domande di brevetto depositate presso l’EPO nel 2024 è stato pari a 199.264, mantenendosi su livelli elevati e sostanzialmente stabili rispetto al 2023, quando le domande presentate erano state 199.452, con una minima flessione (- 0,1%) dopo tre anni di consistente crescita.

La situazione dell’Italia

All’interno di questo quadro, l’Italia ha momentaneamente arrestato il trend di crescita che durava da diversi anni, registrando una contrazione del 4,5% del numero di domande depositate all’EPO (passate dalle 5.053 domande del 2023 alle 4.853 del 2024). Si tratta di un dato in controtendenza rispetto alla media europea (+ 0,3%), in cui l’incremento è stato sostenuto da Irlanda (+ 4,4%), Svizzera (+ 3,1%), Gran Bretagna (+ 3,1%) e Spagna (+ 3%), mentre i due Paesi principali depositari in Europa, Germania (+ 0,4%) e Francia (+ 1,1%), sono rimasti stabili, con minime variazioni rispetto all’anno precedente.

Nonostante il calo, l’Italia mantiene l’undicesima posizione a livello globale per numero di domande di brevetto depositate all’EPO e la quinta posizione tra i Paesi dell’Unione Europea, preceduta da Germania (25.033 domande), Francia (10.980 domande), Paesi Bassi (7.054 domande) e Svezia (4.936 domande). Inoltre, l’Italia rimane tra i primi Paesi europei in termini di adesione al nuovo sistema di brevetto europeo con effetto unitario avviato nel 2023: con 1.666 domande presentate è dietro solo a Germania (5.284 domande) e Francia (1.893 domande), ma con una percentuale di adesione molto superiore, segno della fiducia delle imprese italiane per il nuovo sistema di protezione. Tutti i dati sono disponibili online qui.

Il rallentamento della brevettazione dell’Italia incide negativamente anche su un altro indicatore che già la vedeva faticare negli anni precedenti, ossia il numero di domande di brevetto per milione di abitanti. In questa statistica (disponibile online qui), l’Italia si ferma a circa 82 domande per milione di abitanti, con un tasso inferiore a quello della maggior parte dei paesi europei e ben lontana da quello della Svizzera (circa 1.140 domande per milione di abitanti), che conferma il proprio primato a livello europeo e globale.

I settori tecnologici trainanti

Nel 2024 il settore leader delle domande di brevetto presentate all’EPO (16.815 domande e + 3,3% rispetto al 2023) è stato per la prima volta quello della tecnologia informatica, spinto dalle crescenti invenzioni relative all’intelligenza artificiale ed al machine learning. Il comparto con l’incremento più marcato è stato quello delle macchine elettriche, apparecchi ed energia (16.142 domande presentate e + 8,9% rispetto al 2023), grazie soprattutto alle innovazioni nelle batterie e nelle tecnologie di energia pulita. A seguire, i settori maggiormente cresciuti rispetto al 2023 sono stati quelli delle biotecnologie (+ 5,4%) e dei trasporti (+ 3,5%).

Quest’ultimo è anche il settore in cui l’Italia ha presentato il maggior numero di domande di brevetto (449), verosimilmente per le innovazioni riguardanti le nuove tecnologie di mobilità elettrica. Subito dopo si collocano il settore dell’Handling (439 domande), che comprende anche le tecnologie di imballaggio, nastri trasportatori e carrelli elevatori, il settore delle macchine speciali (331 domande), che copre una vasta gamma di tecnologie tra cui macchine utensili per diverse industrie e stampa 3D, ed il settore delle tecnologie mediche (285 domande). Il comparto in cui in Italia si è registrata la crescita più significativa delle domande di brevetto rispetto al 2023 è quello di motori, pompe e turbine (+ 28,6%), sebbene con numeri ancora contenuti (144 domande).

Questi dati trovano riscontro in quelli relativi alle aziende italiane con il maggior numero di domande di brevetto depositate nel 2024: tra le prime cinque si confermano Coesia S.p.A. (167 domande depositate), Ferrari S.p.A. (136 domande depositate), Iveco Group (55 domande depositate) e Pirelli & C. S.p.A. (49 domande depositate) e si registra la new entry di Leonardo S.p.A. (49 domande depositate). L’EPO rende disponibili sul proprio sito internet i dati aggiornati sulle dieci aziende italiane con il maggior numero di domande di brevetto depositate all’EPO nel 2024.

Il ruolo del nuovo sistema

Dopo un decennio di grande crescita nella brevettazione, il rallentamento del 2024 riporta l’Italia ai livelli del 2022, con un tasso di brevettazione ancora molto basso in Europa in relazione al numero di abitanti, espressione delle mediamente ridotte dimensioni delle imprese che compongono il nostro tessuto industriale.

Tuttavia, l’ampio ricorso al brevetto europeo ad effetto unitario conferma la crescente consapevolezza delle nostre imprese innovatrici dei nuovi strumenti di tutela oggi disponibili a seguito dell’entrata in vigore del Tribunale Unificato dei Brevetti, che dovrebbero nel medio periodo condurre ad un nuovo incremento della brevettazione vista la crescente rilevanza strategica che la protezione brevettuale viene a rivestire nel nuovo sistema.

In January 2025, the European Patent Office (EPO) published two important studies: “Intellectual Property Rights and Firm Performance in the EU” and “Mapping Investors for European Innovators”. These reports provide comprehensive insights into the interplay between intellectual property rights (IPRs), firm performance and the investment landscape for European start-ups.

Intellectual Property Rights and Firm Performance in the EU[1]

This joint study by the EPO and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) analyses the performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and large firms in the European Union in terms of their ownership and use (which can also be declined in terms of strategic exploitation) of patents, trademarks and designs.

The study shows that larger firms tend to invest more capital in their IP portfolio, especially when developing more costly IPRs, namely patents. In particular, 49% of large firms own at least one type of IP right, as opposed to SMEs, which fall short just below 10%. These percentages plummet when taking solely into account patent and design ownership, as only 1% of SMEs own these kind of assets compared to large firms that stand north of 10%.

Moreover, it confirms a strong positive correlation between a firm’s ownership of different types of IPR and its economic performance. Data shows that IPR-owning firms generate, on average, higher revenues per employee, create more jobs and pay higher wages than their counterparts without an IP portfolio. Patent ownership shows the strongest link to firm performance, with about 29% higher revenue per employee and 43% higher wages per employee compared to non-IPR owning firms (data referred to period 2019-2022).

While these findings may seem unsurprising to many, they underscore the critical role of IPRs in enhancing firm performance, particularly for SMEs aiming to scale and compete in the global market against more structured entities. Notably, in fact, IPR-owning SMEs show a significant increase in revenue per employee (+ 44%) than their counterparts, scaling up to 51% higher revenues when their IP portfolio combines patents, trademarks and designs.

Mapping Investors for European Innovators[2]

The second study, published on 16 January 2025 by the EPO, focuses on identifying investors who are crucial for the successful commercialisation of cutting-edge innovations. It sheds light on investment patterns, funding gaps, and the role of both public and private investors in supporting innovation across the EU.  

Start-ups often face financial challenges during the innovation process. A shortage of investments in key technologies and innovation markets poses a significant obstacle to the development of European companies, especially when facing other non-EU competitors. External investors, both private and public, are therefore essential for a start-up’s success and play a crucial role in a company’s ability to innovate and invent.

The study aims at helping inventive start-ups find investors by introducing the Technology Investor Score (TIS), a novel metric which represents the proportion of companies that have filed patent applications in an investor’s portfolio. Investors with a higher TIS score are in principle better equipped to support innovative companies.

For example, when comparing the TIS scores of private European investor networks with their US counterparts, it becomes apparent that EU start-ups face a significant lack of late-stage private funding[3] (which is particularly important for patent-oriented companies, as this is the time when they need substantial investments in order to prepare inventions for market entry). On the contrary, European start-ups heavily rely on public investors – such as Horizon Europe and other national investing initiatives –, especially in relation to basic research, which is mostly financed by universities and government agencies.

To address these challenges, the EPO has updated the Deep Tech Finder[4] (a freely accessible digital tool) to help companies identify the most suitable investors based on criteria such as growth stage, country and technical field. This initiative aims to make it easier for innovative European start-ups to access the funding they need to grow and compete globally.


[1] Full study is available here: https://link.epo.org/web/publications/studies/en-ipr-performance-study.pdf

[2] Full study is available here: https://www.epo.org/en/news-events/news/bridging-gap-mapping-investors-strengthen-europes-innovation-ecosystem

[3] Of the top 100 private investors in Europe, 62% focus on early-stage funding, while only 22% specialise in later-stage funding. In contrast, in the US, 98 of the top 100 investors are private, with more than half focusing on late-stage funding, reflecting stronger private support for scaling high-tech companies.

[4] See https://datavisualisation.apps.epo.org/datav/public/dashboard-frontend/host_epoorg.html#/explore?dataSet=1

Per l’agricoltura italiana il 2024 è stato un anno da record. È quanto emerge dai dati Istat sull’andamento economico del settore agricolo per l’anno appena conclusosi.

È italiano il primato in UE, per valore aggiunto in agricoltura. Con i suoi 42,4 miliardi di euro di valore aggiunto, l’Italia sorpassa la Spagna che registra 39,5 miliardi, la Francia con 35,1 miliardi e la Germania che si ferma a 31,9 miliardi.

Nel 2024 i numeri dell’Italia nel settore agricolo sono aumentati anche in termini produttivi (+1,4%). A crescere sono, soprattutto, i volumi prodotti nelle coltivazioni (+1,5%) e nel comparto zootecnico (+0,6%). In particolare, l’annata è stata molto favorevole per frutta (+5,4%), ortaggi freschi (+3,8%) e vino (+3,5%). Trend in crescita anche per il reddito medio degli agricoltori che è aumentato del 12,5% nel corso del 2024 e per le attività secondarie (+5,2%).

Le chiavi del successo dell’agricoltura italiana risiedono in un mix di diversi fattori, tra cui spiccano l’eccellenza produttiva, la sostenibilità e la diversificazione, intesa come capacità di adattarsi ai cambiamenti ed innovazione.

Il Bel Paese è, infatti, innanzitutto, rinomato per la qualità dei suoi prodotti agroalimentari e vitivinicoli, molti dei quali registrati e protetti con certificazioni come DOP, IGP e BIO, che rappresentano una percentuale significativa dell’export complessivo del settore agroalimentare italiano.  

Inoltre, l’agricoltura italiana, negli ultimi anni, si distingue sempre più per aver ridotto le emissioni di anidride carbonica e l’uso di pesticidi, qualificandosi come tra le più sostenibili in Europa.

A tale ulteriore traguardo contribuisce il fatto che aumenta sempre di più la superficie agricola in Italia destinata a biologico, che già nel 2023 ha raggiunto il record storico di 2,3 milioni di ettari, con oltre 82.000 produttori agricoli, il numero più elevato tra i Paesi dell’Unione Europea. La costruzione di filiere biologiche nazionali è favorita anche dall’obbligo di inserire in etichetta l’origine della materia prima e la volontà, tanto da parte dell’industria che dei consumatori, di valorizzare prodotti c.d. a ‘km zero’.

Terza chiave del successo dell’agrifood italiano è la sua capacità di adattarsi al cambiamento, diversificare e innovare, ampliando l’offerta, investendo in altri canali di distribuzione, come l’e-commerce, in tecniche innovative di produzione, lavorazione e diffusione delle materie; e a prendere sempre più piede in agricoltura sarà anche l’intelligenza artificiale. È stato previsto, infatti, che entro il 2030 un’azienda agricola italiana su cinque adotterà strumenti di gestione direttamente basati sull’AI (intelligenza artificiale), e già si parla di agricoltura 5.0. A riportarlo è una recente analisi di Coldiretti, presentata a Roma durante il Forum internazionale dell’agricoltura e dell’alimentazione lo scorso novembre.

L’innovazione è la strada anche per rispondere alle esigenze particolari dei nostri territori: da qui il via libera alle autorizzazioni per l’uso dei droni per l’impiego efficiente di prodotti fitosanitari (soprattutto nell’agricoltura di montagna o eroica) e alla sperimentazione delle TEA (Tecnologie di Evoluzione Assistita), biotecnologie, sviluppate a partire dagli anni 2000, con lo scopo di selezionare varietà vegetali più resilienti ai cambiamenti climatici e resistenti alle malattie e ai parassiti e con un minore impatto ambientale.  

Il 2024 rappresenta un anno fondamentale per l’agricoltura italiana, che, grazie alla combinazione di innovazione, sostenibilità e qualità, continua a distinguersi in Europa. L’Italia si conferma leader nel settore agroalimentare, con un progresso costante in termini di produzione, reddito e sostenibilità. La capacità di adattarsi ai cambiamenti, investire in nuove tecnologie e promuovere filiere biologiche, fa dell’agricoltura italiana un modello di eccellenza a livello globale. Guardando al futuro, la strada è tracciata: l’innovazione tecnologica e l’impegno per l’ambiente saranno le chiavi per consolidare e accrescere questo successo nei prossimi anni.

Théâtre d’Opéra Spatial

On September 26th, 2024, AI artist Jason Allen filed an appeal at the U.S. District Court of Colorado requesting the reversal of a US Copyright Office (‘USCO’) decision to deny copyright protection for his artwork ‘Théâtre d’Opéra Spatial’.

Mr. Allen’s first attempt to secure copyright protection for his work dates back to September 2022, when he filed a registration application with the USCO. Though, in his first application, Mr. Allen did not disclose that his work was created using an AI system (specifically, Midjourney), the USCO was aware of his work and of the involvement of AI since it had garnered national attention in August 2022 for being the first ‘AI-generated’ (or, according to Mr. Allen ‘AI-assisted’) image to win the Colorado State Fair’s annual fine art competition[1].

The decision of the USCO

Following several correspondence exchange with Mr. Allen, the USCO issued its final decision in September 2023. With said decision, the USCO Review Board denied copyright registration for Mr. Allen’s award-winning artwork since it lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim and, more in depth, ‘it contains more than a de minimis amount of AI-generated content, which must be disclaimed in an application for registration’[2].

In a nutshell, in the USCO’ reasoning[3], if all the traditional elements of authorship, i.e. conception and execution, are generated by a machine, the work lacks human authorship and the USCO cannot register it[4] . If, however, a work containing AI-generated material also contains sufficient human authorship to support a claim to copyright, then the USCO will register the human’s contributions only. In such cases, the applicant must disclose AI-generated content that is more than de minimis. Said disclosure requirement was not met by Mr Allen, who sought to register the entire work and refused to disclaim the portions attributable to AI, hence his work was denied registration.

Mr Allen’s appeal

In the appeal filed last month before the Colorado District Court, Mr. Allen argued that, in finding that his work lacks human authorship, the Office ignored the essential element of human creativity required to create an artwork using Midjourney and ignored the fundamental principle that copyright is meant to be granted to expressions of ideas originating from a human mind[5].

According to Mr. Allen, using Midjourney require the creator to carefully craft prompts to achieve the desired results. In describing the origin of the artwork, Mr. Allen clarifies that the idea behind the artwork was conceived by him, who provided the initial input to the machine, i.e. the image of women in Victorian dresses wearing space helmets. He then selected the colors, the style, the era of the artwork, the setting[6] and arranged all the other elements in the image in order to convey his idea in the artwork.

The final result stems from 624 interactions between Mr. Allen and Midjourney, through which the artist provided new instructions from time to time, based on the AI’s response. Once achieved the desired output, Mr. Allen upscaled and further modified the image for clarity and detail and added few missing elements.

In other words, according to Mr. Allen the work was not created by Midjourney merely through inputting a few prompts or pressing a button. The prompt serves as the initial creative input, embodying the human’s original idea and vision for the artwork and the AI system only functions as a tool to assist the human creator in the actualization of his/her creative idea[7].

The underlying AI-generated work merely constitutes raw material, which Mr. Allen has transformed through his artistic contributions. Said contributions are on par with that expressed by other types of artists in artworks deemed capable of copyright protection by the USCO. Therefore, regardless of whether the underlying AI-generated work is eligible for copyright registration, the entire work in the form submitted to the copyright office should be accepted for registration.

In this regard, Mr. Allen argues that the statutory language of the U.S. Copyright Act supports the notion that AI-assisted artworks with substantial human creative input can indeed be eligible for copyright protection[8] and that the requirements of human conception and execution requested by the USCO are met in his artwork, even if they are declined differently than in traditionally human-created artworks before generative AI came into play.

Finally, Mr. Allen stated that, by refusing to register contents generated via Midjourney and other generative AI systems, the USCO has failed to remain technologically neutral and that denial of copyright protection for the output of such tools would result in a void of ownership: ‘In many instances, a Copyright Examiner may not even be able to distinguish an artwork that used AI tools to assist in the creation from one which does not use any computerized tools, thus making the review process entirely arbitrary[9].

The USCO denial, according to Mr. Allen, is also causing him substantial damages, since, in the months following the final USCO decision, consistent infringements of his work has jeopardize Mr. Allen’s ability to monetize his artistic creation[10].

Generative AI and copyright protection (brief considerations)

The approach adopted by the USCO in Mr. Allen’s case is not novel and, on closer inspection, it is highly common in cases involving applications for copyright registration of artworks generated employing AI[11]. However, this approach, whereby AI-generated works should not be granted protection under copyright law as it was originally conceived to protect human creativity, seems tautological: at the time when copyright protection arose, human creativity was the only conceivable form of creativity, whereas the idea that a machine could create artworks independently (or with limited human contribution) was unimaginable.

Also, the approach whereby works involving AI should be granted protection or not depending on the level of human intervention detectable in them (shown by the USCO in the case at hand) is indeed consistent with traditional concepts of copyright law. However, the same is hardly applicable in practice, as it is based on uncertain parameters (likewise the minimum human contribution to support a copyright claim) that harbour excessive discretion, as argued by Mr. Allen.

This approach is also not consistent with the current technical landscape, whereby AI systems become increasingly autonomous and sophisticated every day, requiring, as a result, less and less human involvement. Nevertheless, applications for registration of AI-generated works are steadily increasing at copyright offices worldwide, calling for a re-thinking of some traditional copyright concepts, so to adapt them to technological evolution[12].

Finally, the approach outlined above, although with the stated purpose of safeguarding human creativity as the bedrock of copyright, ultimately implies the fall of the work into the public domain thus preventing the human artist from exploiting the artwork (as Mr. Allen’s case), whereas works created without employing AI, yet with a degree of creativity equal to pressing a button, would be unquestionably protectable under current USCO case law[13].

The granting of IP protection to AI-generated works does not imply, per se, the awarding of any rights to a machine. Based on the economic rationale of copyright, the incentive provided by IP rights shall be granted to those who are in a position to invest in artificial innovation (thus, clearly, human beings), so as not to hinder, rather to encourage overall progress and follow the path indicated by the European Directives on copyright, most recently the ‘Copyright Directive’[14].

The decision of the Colorado District Court in the case of Mr. Allen is forthcoming. The same may either follow the USCO’s reasoning and approach, as done by the Columbia District Court in Mr. Thaler’s case[15], or favouring a more progressive and realistic approach, as other courts have done in some recent landmark rulings[16].


[1] Contrary to his registration application to the USCO, in his application to the Colorado State Fair’s competition Mr. Allen disclosed that the work had been created using Midjourney (since he was competing in the digital art category). However, none of the jurors was aware that Midjourney is a generative AI system.

[2] See U.S. Copyright Office Review Board, ‘Second Request for Reconsideration for Refusal to Register Théâtre D’opéra Spatial (SR # 1-11743923581; Correspondence ID: 1-5T5320R)’ of 5th September 2023, paragraph III, pg. 3, available at the following link: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/docs/Theatre-Dopera-Spatial.pdf .

[3] Following the reasoning already provided in a public guidance on registration of works created by a generative AI systems issued by the USCO in March 2023 (see Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing Material Generated by Artificial Intelligence, 88 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,192, 16th March 2023, at the following link: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/16/2023-05321/copyright-registration-guidance-works-containing-material-generated-by-artificial-intelligence ).

[4] This conclusion is drawn by the USCO based on the fact that the U.S. Copyright Act protects, and the USCO registers, ‘original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression’ (see 17 U.S.C. § 102a). Courts have interpreted the statutory phrase ‘works of authorship’ to require human creation of the work, stating that ‘human authorship is a bedrock requirement of copyright’ (see the decision issued by the U.S. District Court of Columbia in Thaler v. Perlmutter case, Civil Action No. 22-1564 on 18th August 2023, pg. 8). For this reason, courts have uniformly rejected attempts to protect the creations of non-humans through copyright (see U.S. Copyright Office Review Board, ibidem, paragraph III(A), pg. 3).

[5] See Plaintiff’s complaint and request for declaratory relief and demand for jury trial (‘Plaintiff’s complaint’), Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-2665, filed on 26th September 2024 at the U.S. District Court of Colorado by Tamara Pester, Esq. on behalf of Mr. Allen in the Allen v. Perlmutter case, paragraph 69, available at the following link: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/gdvzkrrmapw/AI%20COPYRIGHT%20REGISTRATION%20appeal.pdf .

[6] I.e. a ‘grand theater, with an audience watching intently, overlooking a large circular window through which the vast expanse of the outer world is visible, adding an otherworldly ambiance to the performance’ (see Plaintiff’s complaint paragraph 16).

[7] In this regard, in the Plaintiff’s complaint Mr. Allen compares the creative process employing generative AI to photography: ‘In a literal sense, the camera captures and develops the photograph, yet no one would dispute the photographer’s authorship. Similarly, Mr. Allen conceived of the image, developed the prompt, and made adjustments to refine the output, thereby ensuring the final image reflects his mental vision. The AI system, much like a camera, is a tool through which the artist’s creativity is realized in visual form.’ (see Plaintiff’s complaint, ibidem, paragraph 80). When photography first gained popularity, critics argued that it lacked skill and artistry, yet it has since become a highly respected and valued art form. According to Mr. Allen AI-assisted art holds the potential to do the same and this evolution should be embraced as a positive development in the creative landscape (see Plaintiff’s complaint, ibidem, paragraph 73).

[8] See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).

[9] See Plaintiff’s complaint, ibidem, paragraph 16.

[10] The following link provides an example of a canvas featuring Mr. Allen’s artwork available for sale on Etsy for $18.65: https://www.etsy.com/listing/1358054636/theatre-dopera-spatial-canvas-art-print .

[11] E.g. in the case of Mr. Thaler, who in February 2022 had his application for copyright registration of the work ‘A Recent Entrance to Paradise’ rejected (see USCO, Second Request for Reconsideration for Refusal to Register A Recent Entrance to Paradise (Correspondence ID 1-3ZPC6C3; SR # 1-7100387071) of 14th February 2022). Unlike Mr. Allen, Mr. Thaler claimed that the AI itself conceived of and created the work independently, with him seeking copyright protection on that AI-generated work based on various legal theories under which a copyright in the AI’s work would transfer to him, e.g., as inventor of the AI-author (called ‘Creativity Machine’) or as the hardware’s owner.

[12] In line with the ‘Constitutional mandate to promote the of science and the useful arts (see Plaintiff’s complaint paragraph 96).

[13]Courts have found it is now settled beyond question that practically anything novel can be copyrighted, even if there is only a faint trace of originality […]. All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the ‘author’ contributed something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably his own. […] No matter how poor artistically the ‘author’s addition, it is enough if it be his own’ (see Plaintiff’s complaint paragraph 46 and the case law mentioned thereby).

[14] Directive (EU) 2019/790 of 17 April 2019.

[15] See U.S. District Court of Columbia, ibidem, where the Court upheld the USCO’s decision and denied copyright protection to Mr. Thaler’s artwork, as described above.

[16] In November 2019, the Court of Nanshan (China) granted copyright protection to a newspaper article written by a robot called ‘Dreamwriter’, owned by the company Shenzhen Tencent, and ordered the other party, Shanghai Yingxun, to pay damages for copyright infringement. In this case, the Nanshan Court found that the AI-written article had a thoughtful structure, clear logic and a certain degree of originality, which met all the requirements for copyright protection. In this work, the human hand was identified as that of the team of Shenzhen Tencent engineers who: designed the operation of the algorithm; selected and entered the data into the algorithm; set the goal (see Shenzhen Nanshan District People’s Court, Shenzhen Tencent Computer System Co., Ltd. vs. Shanghai Yingmou Technology Co., Ltd., available at this link: http://www.ecns.cn/news/2020-01-09/detail-ifzsqcrm6562963.shtml).

Düsseldorf – UPC Local Division (https://www.unified-patent-court.org/en/court/locations)

The order issued by the Düsseldorf Local Division on 31 October 2024 granting the preliminary injunction requested by Valeo Electrification against some entities of the Magna group (available here) may seem one of the several ordinary PIs issued to date by the UPC, but actually includes interesting statements by the Court on the need to apply the general principle of proportionality when issuing provisional measures that may cause significant damages to the enjoined defendant.

The case at hand concerned the alleged infringement of EP 3 320 602 (a parallel case was also brought on EP 3 320 604, decided with an almost identical PI order, available here). The applicant belongs to Valeo Group and is a manufacturer of transmissions and transmission components. Defendants belong to the Magna Group and are also manufacturers of transmissions and transmission components. The parties had recently become competitors in the field of manufacturing and distributing mild hybrid technologies for motor vehicles, specifically electric motor generators.

The order issued by the Düsseldorf Local Division addressed in detail all issues typically dealt with when assessing a request for provisional measures, concluding that the patent in suit is more likely than not to be found valid, is more likely than not to be infringed by the defendants, and there was no delay in seeking relief by the applicant.

The Court lastly addressed the balancing of interests of the parties against each other, taking into account in particular – as per R. 211.3 RoP – any harm that might be caused to one of the parties by the granting of provisional measures or the dismissal of the application. The Court reasoned that under circumstances the interests of the Applicant outweigh those of the Defendants and is therefore justified to grant a preliminary injunction. However, the interests of the defendants still make it necessary in the case at hand, as a “very special” exception, to limit the scope of the preliminary injunction.

Defendants have indeed explained in detail that they would suffer enormous damages in the event of an injunction, since the car manufacturers they supply the infringing embodiment to (including in particular BMW) would not be able to easily replace it with other non-infringing components, including Magna’s or Valeo’s, due to the necessary modifications of the entire mechanical design and the lack of regulatory approval. Car manufacturers would thus be forced to interrupt production and would claim compensation for the resulting damage. The Court also noted that threatened damages in the event of a preliminary injunction covering the defendants’ supply obligations to BMW would be so high that an order to the applicant to provide security would not be a suitable instrument to adopt, as the amount of security required would be so high that the injunction would be practically impossible to enforce for the applicant.

All considered, the Court thus concluded that “The present order takes account of the potentially significant harm identified by the Defendants as being caused by a preliminary injunction by allowing Defendants to fulfil their existing obligations to their customer BMW notwithstanding the preliminary injunction. This is a narrowly defined exception which takes account of the particularities of the automotive industry supply market in general and the harm specifically identified in the present case in the event of an unlimited preliminary injunction. The order preserves the status quo while ensuring at the same time that the Defendants cannot expand their business activities in relation to the challenged embodiments. In particular, the preliminary injunction prohibits the Defendants from offering or distributing the challenged embodiments I and II to other customers than BMW. An increase in the quantities supplied to BMW beyond the existing contracts is also excluded. In order to minimise the disadvantages for the Applicant associated with such a strictly limited possibility of further use, Defendants are obliged to provide security in return” (emphasis added).

The landmark order by the Düsseldorf Local Division marks one of the very first cases where the UPC had the chance to apply the principle of proportionality weighing up the interests of both parties, as provided for under R. 211.3 RoP. We can expect that with the increase of cases and PI requests put forward to the UPC, addressing complex factual constellations, the Court will more and more often find itself carrying out a careful balancing exercise between the conflicting interests of the parties.

A further step will then be assessing whether and how the Court can take into account the interests of third parties as well (e.g. the interests of patients in pharma cases), following in the footsteps of existing national case law that had already established such principle (see e.g. the various decisions by Italian courts that issued PIs tailored to safeguard the interests of third parties in life sciences cases, carving out existing supplies to health authorities or setting a grace period for the injunction to take effect – which we commented on here and here).

La tendenza della giurisprudenza italiana al riconoscimento di un vero e proprio diritto all’immagine in capo alle opere d’arte ha visto una recente ulteriore conferma nella sentenza della Corte d’Appello di Bologna n. 1792 del 24 settembre 2024. La Corte ha infatti – parzialmente – confermato la decisione di primo grado del Tribunale di Bologna, che accoglieva la richiesta da parte del Ministero della Cultura italiano di condanna di un’azienda produttrice di aceto balsamico di Modena per l’indebito utilizzo dell’immagine del celebre ritratto del Duca Francesco I d’Este, realizzato tra il 1638 ed il 1639 dal pittore Diego Velázquez, affidato alle cure della Galleria Estense di Modena.

In particolare, il Ministero della Cultura ha convenuto in giudizio la società che in assenza della necessaria autorizzazione amministrativa e senza versare il canone previsto dalla normativa di riferimento sfruttava l’immagine del dipinto come marchio apposto sui propri prodotti.

La decisione in questione valorizza le disposizioni di cui agli artt. 106, 107 e 108 del D.lgs. n. 42/2004 (cd. “Codice dei Beni Culturali” ovvero, di seguito “C.B.C.”). In particolare, l’articolo 106 C.B.C. prevede che gli enti territoriali e le istituzioni culturali possano richiedere canoni di concessione per consentire l’uso e la riproduzione dei beni culturali che essi hanno in affidamento, e comunque debbano valutare se tali usi sono compatibili con la finalità culturale di tali opere d’arte (disposizione già applicata in diverse decisioni, tra cui Trib. Firenze del 20 aprile 2023, commentata qui, e Trib. Venezia 17 novembre 2022, commentata qui).

I requisiti di legge appena richiamati sono posti a tutela dell’immagine dei beni culturali, al fine di prevenire danni al valore culturale dagli stessi espresso. Secondo la Corte d’Appello di Bologna infatti “al pari del diritto della persona disciplinato dall’art. 10 c.c., può sicuramente configurarsi un diritto all’immagine con riferimento ad un bene culturale in considerazione del suo valore collettivo, che trova il proprio fondamento normativo in un’espressa previsione legislativa ovvero negli artt. 107 e 108 del D.lgs. n. 42/2004, norme di diretta attuazione dell’art. 9 della Costituzione (C. Cost. n. 194/2013), oltre che nei numerosi espressi richiami nello stesso codice al diritto all’immagine e al decoro del bene culturale (artt. 45 co. 1, 49 co. 1 e 2, 52 co. 1-ter, 96, 120 co. 2).” (enfasi aggiunte).

Rigettando la tesi proposta dalla convenuta, i giudici emiliani hanno poi chiarito che la legge non opera alcuna distinzione tra bene culturale inteso come bene materiale ovvero immateriale, fornendo una interpretazione ampia del termine “riproduzione”, che si collega direttamente all’immagine e si sostanzia non solo nella forma esteriore degli oggetti corporei ma anche nella forma impressa su un supporto digitale.

La decisione in commento si aggiunge così alla già numerosa e consolidata giurisprudenza in applicazione delle disposizioni del Codice dei Beni Culturali, da tenere in considerazione da parte di chiunque voglia sfruttare il patrimonio culturale italiano.


English version

The Court of Appeal of Bologna confirms the extension of image rights to works of art: the Duca d’Este case

The trend in Italian case law towards the recognition of image right to the works of art was recently further confirmed in the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Bologna No. 1792 of 24 September 2024. The Court – partially – upheld the first instance decision of the Court of Bologna, which had found in favor of the plaintiff seeking to hold a company producing Balsamic Vinegar of Modena accountable for the unlawful use of the image of the famous portrait of Duke Francesco I d’Este, painted by Diego Velázquez between 1638 and 1639 and housed at the Galleria Estense in Modena.

In particular, the Italian Ministry of Culture brought the proceedings against the company, which had exploited the image of the painting as a trademark for its products without obtaining the necessary administrative authorization and without paying the required royalties:

The decision highlights Articles 106, 107, and 108 of Legislative Decree No. 42/2004 (the so-called “Cultural Heritage Code” or, hereinafter “C.B.C.”). In particular, Article 106 C.B.C. allows local authorities and cultural institutions to request royalties for the use and reproduction of cultural assets under their stewardship, while also evaluating whether such uses align with the cultural purpose of these works of art. This provision has been applied in several decisions, including those issued by the Court of Florence on 20 April 2023, commented here, and the Court of Venice on 17 November 2022, commented here).

The above requirements aim to protect the image of cultural assets, in order to prevent potential harm to the cultural values they express. According to the Court of Appeal of Bologna, “as the right of the person provided for in Article 10 of the [Italian] Civil Code, the image right can certainly be established with reference to a cultural asset, given its public value, which finds its legal grounds in some provisions, namely Articles 107 and 108 of Legislative Decree No. 42/2004, which directly implement Article 9 of the [Italian] Constitution (decision of the Constitutional Court No. 194/2013), as well as in the numerous explicit references in the same code to the image right and the decorum of cultural assets (Articles 45(1), 49(1) and (2), 52(1-ter), 96, 120(2))” (emphasis added).

Dismissing the defendant’s argument, the Court then clarified that the law makes no distinction between cultural assets understood as material or immaterial, adopting a broad interpretation of the term “reproduction”, linking it directly to the image and acknowledging that it is manifested not only in the physical form of tangible objects but also in the form imprinted on an artificial supports.

This decision thus further enriches the extensive and well-established case law regarding the application of the Cultural Heritage Code, which should be taken into account by anyone looking to leverage Italian cultural heritage.

AUTHORITY INVESTIGATION INTO SHEIN

On 25 September 2024, the Italian Competition and Market Authority (“AGCM” or the “Authority”) launched an investigation against the Chinese fast-fashion giant Shein over alleged misleading or omissive environmental messages contained in its Italian website (managed by the Irish company Infinite Styles Services CO. Limited, which is formally the party of the investigation).

More in detail, the Authority holds that Shein’s use of “generic, vague, imprecise” claims over the quality of the products and their environmental impact and recyclability aimed at creating the impression that the garments and manufacturing are sustainable might mislead consumers.

The Authority also notes that the sustainability messages and efforts that Shein passes are at odds with its nature as a “fast or super-fast fashion” brand, which drops on the market hundreds of new cheaply made items each week, and the greenhouse gas emissions reported in the ESG reports of 2022 and 2023 (which increased of 80% from 2022 to 2023).

GREENWASHING: CURRENT AND FUTURE REGULATION

In the context of a growing consumers’ awareness towards climate change and related issues, regulators are making serious efforts to tackle greenwashing. In fact, by the next couple of years, alleged unreliable and unsubstantiated environmental messages might be condemned under Directive (EU) 2024/825 as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and through better information entered into force on 28 February 2024, but which will be applicable starting from 27 September 2026.

Directive (EU) 2024/825, by amending Directive 2005/29/CE and Directive 2011/83/EU, inserts among misleading actions:

  • any false, untruthful or deceiving information on the environmental characteristics of a product and its circularity aspects, such as durability, reparability or recyclability;
  • making an environmental claim related to future environmental performance without clear, objective, publicly available and verifiable commitments set out in a detailed and realistic implementation plan that includes measurable and time-bound targets and other relevant elements necessary to support its implementation, such as allocation of resources, and that is regularly verified by an independent third party expert, whose findings are made available to consumers;
  • advertising benefits to consumers that are irrelevant and do not result from any feature of the product or business;

and among unfair commercial practices:

  • displaying a sustainability label that is not based on a certification scheme or not established by public authorities;
  • making a generic environmental claim for which the trader is not able to demonstrate recognised excellent environmental performance relevant to the claim;
  • making an environmental claim about the entire product or the trader’s entire business when it concerns only a certain aspect of the product or a specific activity of the trader’s business;
  • claiming, based on the offsetting of greenhouse gas emissions, that a product has a neutral, reduced or positive impact on the environment in terms of greenhouse gas emissions.

In the framework of strategic initiatives and action policies adopted by the European Union on greenwashing and circular economy, Directive (EU) 2024/825 will be complemented by a Directive on Green Claims, which will provide more specific rules on environmental claims. The Directive on Green Claims is still a proposal, but we gave deeper preliminary insights on it here.

THE UK PRECEDENT IN THE FASHION SECTOR

The Italian Authority followed the steps of the British Competition Markets Authority (“CMA”), which earlier this year closed an investigation launched into three major fashion retailers (Asos, Boohoo and Asda) about their eco-friendly claims. The three businesses signed formal agreements to use only accurate, specific and clear green claims. The undertakings are listed here.

Among the changes to look forward from the upcoming review of the 2002 Community Design Regulation (“CDR”), which has been endorsed by the Parliament and awaits formal approval by the Council before entering into force, one lies under Art. 1(126) of the current draft proposal (text available here, state of approval here). Despite not being discussed in the explanatory memorandum, the new Regulation looks to remove the second sentence of Art. 110a(5) CDR, which is currently in force and provides as follows:

Pursuant to Article 11, a design which has not been made public within the territory of the Community shall not enjoy protection as an unregistered Community design

This provision was added to the CDR among the many changes made to EU legislation in the context of the Treaty of Accession of the ten countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia – full text here). Since its introduction, it has caused an inconsistency between the making available of unregistered community designs (“UCDs”) for the purposes of obtaining the three-year protection provided upon first disclosure (Art. 11 CDR) and destroying/maintaining novelty, which is required to obtain registered/unregistered design protection in the first place (cf. Art. 11 CDR combined with Articles 4, 5 and 7 CDR).

More specifically, as the law currently stands, first time disclosure outside the EU does not give rise to an unregistered design right (as it would if the same design were disclosed “within the Community”), but does destroy novelty, both for the purposes of later seeking an EU registration and/or obtaining a UCD by subsequently disclosing the design within the EU. While the consequence for obtaining registration is mitigated by the one-year grace period provided under Art. 7(2) CDR, unregistered protection is lost without remedy.

The discrepancy, which has been deemed “protectionist” and in breach of Art. 3(1) TRIPS (national treatment), lies in the fact that – by virtue of Art. 110a(5) CDR – the CDR disregards foreign disclosures for the purposes of awarding unregistered protection, but contains no equivalent provision for preserving novelty. As a result, products launched outside the EU – such as in one of the many trade fairs taking place in Asia, the USA or, following Brexit, the UK – are de facto deprived of unregistered design rights (the novelty of a design disclosed abroad could still be saved if one were able to argue that the design disclosed could not “reasonably have become known in the normal course of business to the circles specialized in the sector concerned, operating within the Community” (Art. 7 CDR). Room for this defence however appears minimal).

Throughout the years, attempts have been made to question the interpretation of Art. 110a(5) CDR to try to fix the issue, unsurprisingly without success. In 2008, the German Federal Court of Justice (“Bundesgerichtshof” – BGH) refused to refer the matter to the CJEU, stating that the wording of Art. 110a(5) CDR left no room for interpretation (cf. decision of 9 October 2008 in case I ZR 126/06 (“Gebäckpresse”), [28]-[30], where the BGH held that an application for registered design in China had destroyed novelty for the purposes of subsequently claiming UCD). The issue was then raised again before HHJ Hacon, in the UK, who referred interpretation of Art. 110a(5) CDR to the CJEU in Beverly Hills Teddy Bear Company v PMS International Group Plc [2019] EWHC 2419 (IPEC) (17 September 2019) – available here. The dispute, which concerned toys first disclosed at a trade fair in Hong Kong, was however settled before the CJEU could provide clarity on the matter (here).

As anticipated, the upcoming Regulation on European Union designs should address this loophole by removing Art. 110a(5) altogether. Notably, a minor inconsistency will remain between the wording regarding disclosure under Art. 7(1) and 11(1) CDR, as the latter will still refer – for unregistered design protection – to making available to the public “within the Community” (but not within “the territory” of the Community, as does Art.110a(5) CDR). The relevance, if any, that the Courts will attribute to this, following reform of the CDR, remains to be seen.

Until then, designers should be mindful of the existing legal framework when planning first disclosure of their next creation, ensuring that they seek registration if they intend to launch their products outside of EU territory (either before they do so or within the one year grace period provided under Art. 7(2) CDR), especially for products that they expect will have significant market potential within the EU.