In January 2025, the European Patent Office (EPO) published two important studies: “Intellectual Property Rights and Firm Performance in the EU” and “Mapping Investors for European Innovators”. These reports provide comprehensive insights into the interplay between intellectual property rights (IPRs), firm performance and the investment landscape for European start-ups.

Intellectual Property Rights and Firm Performance in the EU[1]

This joint study by the EPO and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) analyses the performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and large firms in the European Union in terms of their ownership and use (which can also be declined in terms of strategic exploitation) of patents, trademarks and designs.

The study shows that larger firms tend to invest more capital in their IP portfolio, especially when developing more costly IPRs, namely patents. In particular, 49% of large firms own at least one type of IP right, as opposed to SMEs, which fall short just below 10%. These percentages plummet when taking solely into account patent and design ownership, as only 1% of SMEs own these kind of assets compared to large firms that stand north of 10%.

Moreover, it confirms a strong positive correlation between a firm’s ownership of different types of IPR and its economic performance. Data shows that IPR-owning firms generate, on average, higher revenues per employee, create more jobs and pay higher wages than their counterparts without an IP portfolio. Patent ownership shows the strongest link to firm performance, with about 29% higher revenue per employee and 43% higher wages per employee compared to non-IPR owning firms (data referred to period 2019-2022).

While these findings may seem unsurprising to many, they underscore the critical role of IPRs in enhancing firm performance, particularly for SMEs aiming to scale and compete in the global market against more structured entities. Notably, in fact, IPR-owning SMEs show a significant increase in revenue per employee (+ 44%) than their counterparts, scaling up to 51% higher revenues when their IP portfolio combines patents, trademarks and designs.

Mapping Investors for European Innovators[2]

The second study, published on 16 January 2025 by the EPO, focuses on identifying investors who are crucial for the successful commercialisation of cutting-edge innovations. It sheds light on investment patterns, funding gaps, and the role of both public and private investors in supporting innovation across the EU.  

Start-ups often face financial challenges during the innovation process. A shortage of investments in key technologies and innovation markets poses a significant obstacle to the development of European companies, especially when facing other non-EU competitors. External investors, both private and public, are therefore essential for a start-up’s success and play a crucial role in a company’s ability to innovate and invent.

The study aims at helping inventive start-ups find investors by introducing the Technology Investor Score (TIS), a novel metric which represents the proportion of companies that have filed patent applications in an investor’s portfolio. Investors with a higher TIS score are in principle better equipped to support innovative companies.

For example, when comparing the TIS scores of private European investor networks with their US counterparts, it becomes apparent that EU start-ups face a significant lack of late-stage private funding[3] (which is particularly important for patent-oriented companies, as this is the time when they need substantial investments in order to prepare inventions for market entry). On the contrary, European start-ups heavily rely on public investors – such as Horizon Europe and other national investing initiatives –, especially in relation to basic research, which is mostly financed by universities and government agencies.

To address these challenges, the EPO has updated the Deep Tech Finder[4] (a freely accessible digital tool) to help companies identify the most suitable investors based on criteria such as growth stage, country and technical field. This initiative aims to make it easier for innovative European start-ups to access the funding they need to grow and compete globally.

[1] Full study is available here: https://link.epo.org/web/publications/studies/en-ipr-performance-study.pdf

[2] Full study is available here: https://www.epo.org/en/news-events/news/bridging-gap-mapping-investors-strengthen-europes-innovation-ecosystem

[3] Of the top 100 private investors in Europe, 62% focus on early-stage funding, while only 22% specialise in later-stage funding. In contrast, in the US, 98 of the top 100 investors are private, with more than half focusing on late-stage funding, reflecting stronger private support for scaling high-tech companies.

[4] See https://datavisualisation.apps.epo.org/datav/public/dashboard-frontend/host_epoorg.html#/explore?dataSet=1

Per l’agricoltura italiana il 2024 è stato un anno da record. È quanto emerge dai dati Istat sull’andamento economico del settore agricolo per l’anno appena conclusosi.

È italiano il primato in UE, per valore aggiunto in agricoltura. Con i suoi 42,4 miliardi di euro di valore aggiunto, l’Italia sorpassa la Spagna che registra 39,5 miliardi, la Francia con 35,1 miliardi e la Germania che si ferma a 31,9 miliardi.

Nel 2024 i numeri dell’Italia nel settore agricolo sono aumentati anche in termini produttivi (+1,4%). A crescere sono, soprattutto, i volumi prodotti nelle coltivazioni (+1,5%) e nel comparto zootecnico (+0,6%). In particolare, l’annata è stata molto favorevole per frutta (+5,4%), ortaggi freschi (+3,8%) e vino (+3,5%). Trend in crescita anche per il reddito medio degli agricoltori che è aumentato del 12,5% nel corso del 2024 e per le attività secondarie (+5,2%).

Le chiavi del successo dell’agricoltura italiana risiedono in un mix di diversi fattori, tra cui spiccano l’eccellenza produttiva, la sostenibilità e la diversificazione, intesa come capacità di adattarsi ai cambiamenti ed innovazione.

Il Bel Paese è, infatti, innanzitutto, rinomato per la qualità dei suoi prodotti agroalimentari e vitivinicoli, molti dei quali registrati e protetti con certificazioni come DOP, IGP e BIO, che rappresentano una percentuale significativa dell’export complessivo del settore agroalimentare italiano.  

Inoltre, l’agricoltura italiana, negli ultimi anni, si distingue sempre più per aver ridotto le emissioni di anidride carbonica e l’uso di pesticidi, qualificandosi come tra le più sostenibili in Europa.

A tale ulteriore traguardo contribuisce il fatto che aumenta sempre di più la superficie agricola in Italia destinata a biologico, che già nel 2023 ha raggiunto il record storico di 2,3 milioni di ettari, con oltre 82.000 produttori agricoli, il numero più elevato tra i Paesi dell’Unione Europea. La costruzione di filiere biologiche nazionali è favorita anche dall’obbligo di inserire in etichetta l’origine della materia prima e la volontà, tanto da parte dell’industria che dei consumatori, di valorizzare prodotti c.d. a ‘km zero’.

Terza chiave del successo dell’agrifood italiano è la sua capacità di adattarsi al cambiamento, diversificare e innovare, ampliando l’offerta, investendo in altri canali di distribuzione, come l’e-commerce, in tecniche innovative di produzione, lavorazione e diffusione delle materie; e a prendere sempre più piede in agricoltura sarà anche l’intelligenza artificiale. È stato previsto, infatti, che entro il 2030 un’azienda agricola italiana su cinque adotterà strumenti di gestione direttamente basati sull’AI (intelligenza artificiale), e già si parla di agricoltura 5.0. A riportarlo è una recente analisi di Coldiretti, presentata a Roma durante il Forum internazionale dell’agricoltura e dell’alimentazione lo scorso novembre.

L’innovazione è la strada anche per rispondere alle esigenze particolari dei nostri territori: da qui il via libera alle autorizzazioni per l’uso dei droni per l’impiego efficiente di prodotti fitosanitari (soprattutto nell’agricoltura di montagna o eroica) e alla sperimentazione delle TEA (Tecnologie di Evoluzione Assistita), biotecnologie, sviluppate a partire dagli anni 2000, con lo scopo di selezionare varietà vegetali più resilienti ai cambiamenti climatici e resistenti alle malattie e ai parassiti e con un minore impatto ambientale.  

Il 2024 rappresenta un anno fondamentale per l’agricoltura italiana, che, grazie alla combinazione di innovazione, sostenibilità e qualità, continua a distinguersi in Europa. L’Italia si conferma leader nel settore agroalimentare, con un progresso costante in termini di produzione, reddito e sostenibilità. La capacità di adattarsi ai cambiamenti, investire in nuove tecnologie e promuovere filiere biologiche, fa dell’agricoltura italiana un modello di eccellenza a livello globale. Guardando al futuro, la strada è tracciata: l’innovazione tecnologica e l’impegno per l’ambiente saranno le chiavi per consolidare e accrescere questo successo nei prossimi anni.

“Théâtre d’Opéra Spatial“

On September 26th, 2024, AI artist Jason Allen filed an appeal at the U.S. District Court of Colorado requesting the reversal of a US Copyright Office (‘USCO’) decision to deny copyright protection for his artwork ‘Théâtre d’Opéra Spatial’.

Mr. Allen’s first attempt to secure copyright protection for his work dates back to September 2022, when he filed a registration application with the USCO. Though, in his first application, Mr. Allen did not disclose that his work was created using an AI system (specifically, Midjourney), the USCO was aware of his work and of the involvement of AI since it had garnered national attention in August 2022 for being the first ‘AI-generated’ (or, according to Mr. Allen ‘AI-assisted’) image to win the Colorado State Fair’s annual fine art competition[1].

The decision of the USCO

Following several correspondence exchange with Mr. Allen, the USCO issued its final decision in September 2023. With said decision, the USCO Review Board denied copyright registration for Mr. Allen’s award-winning artwork since it lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim and, more in depth, ‘it contains more than a de minimis amount of AI-generated content, which must be disclaimed in an application for registration’[2].

In a nutshell, in the USCO’ reasoning[3], if all the traditional elements of authorship, i.e. conception and execution, are generated by a machine, the work lacks human authorship and the USCO cannot register it[4] . If, however, a work containing AI-generated material also contains sufficient human authorship to support a claim to copyright, then the USCO will register the human’s contributions only. In such cases, the applicant must disclose AI-generated content that is more than de minimis. Said disclosure requirement was not met by Mr Allen, who sought to register the entire work and refused to disclaim the portions attributable to AI, hence his work was denied registration.

Mr Allen’s appeal

In the appeal filed last month before the Colorado District Court, Mr. Allen argued that, in finding that his work lacks human authorship, the Office ignored the essential element of human creativity required to create an artwork using Midjourney and ignored the fundamental principle that copyright is meant to be granted to expressions of ideas originating from a human mind[5].

According to Mr. Allen, using Midjourney require the creator to carefully craft prompts to achieve the desired results. In describing the origin of the artwork, Mr. Allen clarifies that the idea behind the artwork was conceived by him, who provided the initial input to the machine, i.e. the image of women in Victorian dresses wearing space helmets. He then selected the colors, the style, the era of the artwork, the setting[6] and arranged all the other elements in the image in order to convey his idea in the artwork.

The final result stems from 624 interactions between Mr. Allen and Midjourney, through which the artist provided new instructions from time to time, based on the AI’s response. Once achieved the desired output, Mr. Allen upscaled and further modified the image for clarity and detail and added few missing elements.

In other words, according to Mr. Allen the work was not created by Midjourney merely through inputting a few prompts or pressing a button. The prompt serves as the initial creative input, embodying the human’s original idea and vision for the artwork and the AI system only functions as a tool to assist the human creator in the actualization of his/her creative idea[7].

The underlying AI-generated work merely constitutes raw material, which Mr. Allen has transformed through his artistic contributions. Said contributions are on par with that expressed by other types of artists in artworks deemed capable of copyright protection by the USCO. Therefore, regardless of whether the underlying AI-generated work is eligible for copyright registration, the entire work in the form submitted to the copyright office should be accepted for registration.

In this regard, Mr. Allen argues that the statutory language of the U.S. Copyright Act supports the notion that AI-assisted artworks with substantial human creative input can indeed be eligible for copyright protection[8] and that the requirements of human conception and execution requested by the USCO are met in his artwork, even if they are declined differently than in traditionally human-created artworks before generative AI came into play.

Finally, Mr. Allen stated that, by refusing to register contents generated via Midjourney and other generative AI systems, the USCO has failed to remain technologically neutral and that denial of copyright protection for the output of such tools would result in a void of ownership: ‘In many instances, a Copyright Examiner may not even be able to distinguish an artwork that used AI tools to assist in the creation from one which does not use any computerized tools, thus making the review process entirely arbitrary’[9].

The USCO denial, according to Mr. Allen, is also causing him substantial damages, since, in the months following the final USCO decision, consistent infringements of his work has jeopardize Mr. Allen’s ability to monetize his artistic creation[10].

Generative AI and copyright protection (brief considerations)

The approach adopted by the USCO in Mr. Allen’s case is not novel and, on closer inspection, it is highly common in cases involving applications for copyright registration of artworks generated employing AI[11]. However, this approach, whereby AI-generated works should not be granted protection under copyright law as it was originally conceived to protect human creativity, seems tautological: at the time when copyright protection arose, human creativity was the only conceivable form of creativity, whereas the idea that a machine could create artworks independently (or with limited human contribution) was unimaginable.

Also, the approach whereby works involving AI should be granted protection or not depending on the level of human intervention detectable in them (shown by the USCO in the case at hand) is indeed consistent with traditional concepts of copyright law. However, the same is hardly applicable in practice, as it is based on uncertain parameters (likewise the minimum human contribution to support a copyright claim) that harbour excessive discretion, as argued by Mr. Allen.

This approach is also not consistent with the current technical landscape, whereby AI systems become increasingly autonomous and sophisticated every day, requiring, as a result, less and less human involvement. Nevertheless, applications for registration of AI-generated works are steadily increasing at copyright offices worldwide, calling for a re-thinking of some traditional copyright concepts, so to adapt them to technological evolution[12].

Finally, the approach outlined above, although with the stated purpose of safeguarding human creativity as the bedrock of copyright, ultimately implies the fall of the work into the public domain thus preventing the human artist from exploiting the artwork (as Mr. Allen’s case), whereas works created without employing AI, yet with a degree of creativity equal to pressing a button, would be unquestionably protectable under current USCO case law[13].

The granting of IP protection to AI-generated works does not imply, per se, the awarding of any rights to a machine. Based on the economic rationale of copyright, the incentive provided by IP rights shall be granted to those who are in a position to invest in artificial innovation (thus, clearly, human beings), so as not to hinder, rather to encourage overall progress and follow the path indicated by the European Directives on copyright, most recently the ‘Copyright Directive’[14].

The decision of the Colorado District Court in the case of Mr. Allen is forthcoming. The same may either follow the USCO’s reasoning and approach, as done by the Columbia District Court in Mr. Thaler’s case[15], or favouring a more progressive and realistic approach, as other courts have done in some recent landmark rulings[16].

[1] Contrary to his registration application to the USCO, in his application to the Colorado State Fair’s competition Mr. Allen disclosed that the work had been created using Midjourney (since he was competing in the digital art category). However, none of the jurors was aware that Midjourney is a generative AI system.

[2] See U.S. Copyright Office Review Board, ‘Second Request for Reconsideration for Refusal to Register Théâtre D’opéra Spatial (SR # 1-11743923581; Correspondence ID: 1-5T5320R)’ of 5th September 2023, paragraph III, pg. 3, available at the following link: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/docs/Theatre-Dopera-Spatial.pdf .

[3] Following the reasoning already provided in a public guidance on registration of works created by a generative AI systems issued by the USCO in March 2023 (see Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing Material Generated by Artificial Intelligence, 88 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,192, 16th March 2023, at the following link: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/16/2023-05321/copyright-registration-guidance-works-containing-material-generated-by-artificial-intelligence ).

[4] This conclusion is drawn by the USCO based on the fact that the U.S. Copyright Act protects, and the USCO registers, ‘original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression’ (see 17 U.S.C. § 102a). Courts have interpreted the statutory phrase ‘works of authorship’ to require human creation of the work, stating that ‘human authorship is a bedrock requirement of copyright’ (see the decision issued by the U.S. District Court of Columbia in Thaler v. Perlmutter case, Civil Action No. 22-1564 on 18th August 2023, pg. 8). For this reason, courts have uniformly rejected attempts to protect the creations of non-humans through copyright (see U.S. Copyright Office Review Board, ibidem, paragraph III(A), pg. 3).

[5] See Plaintiff’s complaint and request for declaratory relief and demand for jury trial (‘Plaintiff’s complaint’), Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-2665, filed on 26th September 2024 at the U.S. District Court of Colorado by Tamara Pester, Esq. on behalf of Mr. Allen in the Allen v. Perlmutter case, paragraph 69, available at the following link: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/gdvzkrrmapw/AI%20COPYRIGHT%20REGISTRATION%20appeal.pdf .

[6] I.e. a ‘grand theater, with an audience watching intently, overlooking a large circular window through which the vast expanse of the outer world is visible, adding an otherworldly ambiance to the performance’ (see Plaintiff’s complaint paragraph 16).

[7] In this regard, in the Plaintiff’s complaint Mr. Allen compares the creative process employing generative AI to photography: ‘In a literal sense, the camera captures and develops the photograph, yet no one would dispute the photographer’s authorship. Similarly, Mr. Allen conceived of the image, developed the prompt, and made adjustments to refine the output, thereby ensuring the final image reflects his mental vision. The AI system, much like a camera, is a tool through which the artist’s creativity is realized in visual form.’ (see Plaintiff’s complaint, ibidem, paragraph 80). When photography first gained popularity, critics argued that it lacked skill and artistry, yet it has since become a highly respected and valued art form. According to Mr. Allen AI-assisted art holds the potential to do the same and this evolution should be embraced as a positive development in the creative landscape (see Plaintiff’s complaint, ibidem, paragraph 73).

[8] See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).

[9] See Plaintiff’s complaint, ibidem, paragraph 16.

[10] The following link provides an example of a canvas featuring Mr. Allen’s artwork available for sale on Etsy for $18.65: https://www.etsy.com/listing/1358054636/theatre-dopera-spatial-canvas-art-print .

[11] E.g. in the case of Mr. Thaler, who in February 2022 had his application for copyright registration of the work ‘A Recent Entrance to Paradise’ rejected (see USCO, Second Request for Reconsideration for Refusal to Register A Recent Entrance to Paradise (Correspondence ID 1-3ZPC6C3; SR # 1-7100387071) of 14th February 2022). Unlike Mr. Allen, Mr. Thaler claimed that the AI itself conceived of and created the work independently, with him seeking copyright protection on that AI-generated work based on various legal theories under which a copyright in the AI’s work would transfer to him, e.g., as inventor of the AI-author (called ‘Creativity Machine’) or as the hardware’s owner.

[12] In line with the ‘Constitutional mandate to promote the of science and the useful arts (see Plaintiff’s complaint paragraph 96).

[13] ‘Courts have found it is now settled beyond question that practically anything novel can be copyrighted, even if there is only a faint trace of originality […]. All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the ‘author’ contributed something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably his own. […] No matter how poor artistically the ‘author’s addition, it is enough if it be his own’ (see Plaintiff’s complaint paragraph 46 and the case law mentioned thereby).

[14] Directive (EU) 2019/790 of 17 April 2019.

[15] See U.S. District Court of Columbia, ibidem, where the Court upheld the USCO’s decision and denied copyright protection to Mr. Thaler’s artwork, as described above.

[16] In November 2019, the Court of Nanshan (China) granted copyright protection to a newspaper article written by a robot called ‘Dreamwriter’, owned by the company Shenzhen Tencent, and ordered the other party, Shanghai Yingxun, to pay damages for copyright infringement. In this case, the Nanshan Court found that the AI-written article had a thoughtful structure, clear logic and a certain degree of originality, which met all the requirements for copyright protection. In this work, the human hand was identified as that of the team of Shenzhen Tencent engineers who: designed the operation of the algorithm; selected and entered the data into the algorithm; set the goal (see Shenzhen Nanshan District People’s Court, Shenzhen Tencent Computer System Co., Ltd. vs. Shanghai Yingmou Technology Co., Ltd., available at this link: http://www.ecns.cn/news/2020-01-09/detail-ifzsqcrm6562963.shtml).

Düsseldorf – UPC Local Division (https://www.unified-patent-court.org/en/court/locations)

The order issued by the Düsseldorf Local Division on 31 October 2024 granting the preliminary injunction requested by Valeo Electrification against some entities of the Magna group (available here) may seem one of the several ordinary PIs issued to date by the UPC, but actually includes interesting statements by the Court on the need to apply the general principle of proportionality when issuing provisional measures that may cause significant damages to the enjoined defendant.

The case at hand concerned the alleged infringement of EP 3 320 602 (a parallel case was also brought on EP 3 320 604, decided with an almost identical PI order, available here). The applicant belongs to Valeo Group and is a manufacturer of transmissions and transmission components. Defendants belong to the Magna Group and are also manufacturers of transmissions and transmission components. The parties had recently become competitors in the field of manufacturing and distributing mild hybrid technologies for motor vehicles, specifically electric motor generators.

The order issued by the Düsseldorf Local Division addressed in detail all issues typically dealt with when assessing a request for provisional measures, concluding that the patent in suit is more likely than not to be found valid, is more likely than not to be infringed by the defendants, and there was no delay in seeking relief by the applicant.

The Court lastly addressed the balancing of interests of the parties against each other, taking into account in particular – as per R. 211.3 RoP – any harm that might be caused to one of the parties by the granting of provisional measures or the dismissal of the application. The Court reasoned that under circumstances the interests of the Applicant outweigh those of the Defendants and is therefore justified to grant a preliminary injunction. However, the interests of the defendants still make it necessary in the case at hand, as a “very special” exception, to limit the scope of the preliminary injunction.

Defendants have indeed explained in detail that they would suffer enormous damages in the event of an injunction, since the car manufacturers they supply the infringing embodiment to (including in particular BMW) would not be able to easily replace it with other non-infringing components, including Magna’s or Valeo’s, due to the necessary modifications of the entire mechanical design and the lack of regulatory approval. Car manufacturers would thus be forced to interrupt production and would claim compensation for the resulting damage. The Court also noted that threatened damages in the event of a preliminary injunction covering the defendants’ supply obligations to BMW would be so high that an order to the applicant to provide security would not be a suitable instrument to adopt, as the amount of security required would be so high that the injunction would be practically impossible to enforce for the applicant.

All considered, the Court thus concluded that “The present order takes account of the potentially significant harm identified by the Defendants as being caused by a preliminary injunction by allowing Defendants to fulfil their existing obligations to their customer BMW notwithstanding the preliminary injunction. This is a narrowly defined exception which takes account of the particularities of the automotive industry supply market in general and the harm specifically identified in the present case in the event of an unlimited preliminary injunction. The order preserves the status quo while ensuring at the same time that the Defendants cannot expand their business activities in relation to the challenged embodiments. In particular, the preliminary injunction prohibits the Defendants from offering or distributing the challenged embodiments I and II to other customers than BMW. An increase in the quantities supplied to BMW beyond the existing contracts is also excluded. In order to minimise the disadvantages for the Applicant associated with such a strictly limited possibility of further use, Defendants are obliged to provide security in return” (emphasis added).

The landmark order by the Düsseldorf Local Division marks one of the very first cases where the UPC had the chance to apply the principle of proportionality weighing up the interests of both parties, as provided for under R. 211.3 RoP. We can expect that with the increase of cases and PI requests put forward to the UPC, addressing complex factual constellations, the Court will more and more often find itself carrying out a careful balancing exercise between the conflicting interests of the parties.

A further step will then be assessing whether and how the Court can take into account the interests of third parties as well (e.g. the interests of patients in pharma cases), following in the footsteps of existing national case law that had already established such principle (see e.g. the various decisions by Italian courts that issued PIs tailored to safeguard the interests of third parties in life sciences cases, carving out existing supplies to health authorities or setting a grace period for the injunction to take effect – which we commented on here and here).

La tendenza della giurisprudenza italiana al riconoscimento di un vero e proprio diritto all’immagine in capo alle opere d’arte ha visto una recente ulteriore conferma nella sentenza della Corte d’Appello di Bologna n. 1792 del 24 settembre 2024. La Corte ha infatti – parzialmente – confermato la decisione di primo grado del Tribunale di Bologna, che accoglieva la richiesta da parte del Ministero della Cultura italiano di condanna di un’azienda produttrice di aceto balsamico di Modena per l’indebito utilizzo dell’immagine del celebre ritratto del Duca Francesco I d’Este, realizzato tra il 1638 ed il 1639 dal pittore Diego Velázquez, affidato alle cure della Galleria Estense di Modena.

In particolare, il Ministero della Cultura ha convenuto in giudizio la società che in assenza della necessaria autorizzazione amministrativa e senza versare il canone previsto dalla normativa di riferimento sfruttava l’immagine del dipinto come marchio apposto sui propri prodotti.

La decisione in questione valorizza le disposizioni di cui agli artt. 106, 107 e 108 del D.lgs. n. 42/2004 (cd. “Codice dei Beni Culturali” ovvero, di seguito “C.B.C.”). In particolare, l’articolo 106 C.B.C. prevede che gli enti territoriali e le istituzioni culturali possano richiedere canoni di concessione per consentire l’uso e la riproduzione dei beni culturali che essi hanno in affidamento, e comunque debbano valutare se tali usi sono compatibili con la finalità culturale di tali opere d’arte (disposizione già applicata in diverse decisioni, tra cui Trib. Firenze del 20 aprile 2023, commentata qui, e Trib. Venezia 17 novembre 2022, commentata qui).

I requisiti di legge appena richiamati sono posti a tutela dell’immagine dei beni culturali, al fine di prevenire danni al valore culturale dagli stessi espresso. Secondo la Corte d’Appello di Bologna infatti “al pari del diritto della persona disciplinato dall’art. 10 c.c., può sicuramente configurarsi un diritto all’immagine con riferimento ad un bene culturale in considerazione del suo valore collettivo, che trova il proprio fondamento normativo in un’espressa previsione legislativa ovvero negli artt. 107 e 108 del D.lgs. n. 42/2004, norme di diretta attuazione dell’art. 9 della Costituzione (C. Cost. n. 194/2013), oltre che nei numerosi espressi richiami nello stesso codice al diritto all’immagine e al decoro del bene culturale (artt. 45 co. 1, 49 co. 1 e 2, 52 co. 1-ter, 96, 120 co. 2).” (enfasi aggiunte).

Rigettando la tesi proposta dalla convenuta, i giudici emiliani hanno poi chiarito che la legge non opera alcuna distinzione tra bene culturale inteso come bene materiale ovvero immateriale, fornendo una interpretazione ampia del termine “riproduzione”, che si collega direttamente all’immagine e si sostanzia non solo nella forma esteriore degli oggetti corporei ma anche nella forma impressa su un supporto digitale.

La decisione in commento si aggiunge così alla già numerosa e consolidata giurisprudenza in applicazione delle disposizioni del Codice dei Beni Culturali, da tenere in considerazione da parte di chiunque voglia sfruttare il patrimonio culturale italiano.

English version

The Court of Appeal of Bologna confirms the extension of image rights to works of art: the Duca d’Este case

The trend in Italian case law towards the recognition of image right to the works of art was recently further confirmed in the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Bologna No. 1792 of 24 September 2024. The Court – partially – upheld the first instance decision of the Court of Bologna, which had found in favor of the plaintiff seeking to hold a company producing Balsamic Vinegar of Modena accountable for the unlawful use of the image of the famous portrait of Duke Francesco I d’Este, painted by Diego Velázquez between 1638 and 1639 and housed at the Galleria Estense in Modena.

In particular, the Italian Ministry of Culture brought the proceedings against the company, which had exploited the image of the painting as a trademark for its products without obtaining the necessary administrative authorization and without paying the required royalties:

The decision highlights Articles 106, 107, and 108 of Legislative Decree No. 42/2004 (the so-called “Cultural Heritage Code” or, hereinafter “C.B.C.”). In particular, Article 106 C.B.C. allows local authorities and cultural institutions to request royalties for the use and reproduction of cultural assets under their stewardship, while also evaluating whether such uses align with the cultural purpose of these works of art. This provision has been applied in several decisions, including those issued by the Court of Florence on 20 April 2023, commented here, and the Court of Venice on 17 November 2022, commented here).

The above requirements aim to protect the image of cultural assets, in order to prevent potential harm to the cultural values they express. According to the Court of Appeal of Bologna, “as the right of the person provided for in Article 10 of the [Italian] Civil Code, the image right can certainly be established with reference to a cultural asset, given its public value, which finds its legal grounds in some provisions, namely Articles 107 and 108 of Legislative Decree No. 42/2004, which directly implement Article 9 of the [Italian] Constitution (decision of the Constitutional Court No. 194/2013), as well as in the numerous explicit references in the same code to the image right and the decorum of cultural assets (Articles 45(1), 49(1) and (2), 52(1-ter), 96, 120(2))” (emphasis added).

Dismissing the defendant’s argument, the Court then clarified that the law makes no distinction between cultural assets understood as material or immaterial, adopting a broad interpretation of the term “reproduction”, linking it directly to the image and acknowledging that it is manifested not only in the physical form of tangible objects but also in the form imprinted on an artificial supports.

This decision thus further enriches the extensive and well-established case law regarding the application of the Cultural Heritage Code, which should be taken into account by anyone looking to leverage Italian cultural heritage.

AUTHORITY INVESTIGATION INTO SHEIN

On 25 September 2024, the Italian Competition and Market Authority (“AGCM” or the “Authority”) launched an investigation against the Chinese fast-fashion giant Shein over alleged misleading or omissive environmental messages contained in its Italian website (managed by the Irish company Infinite Styles Services CO. Limited, which is formally the party of the investigation).

More in detail, the Authority holds that Shein’s use of “generic, vague, imprecise” claims over the quality of the products and their environmental impact and recyclability aimed at creating the impression that the garments and manufacturing are sustainable might mislead consumers.

The Authority also notes that the sustainability messages and efforts that Shein passes are at odds with its nature as a “fast or super-fast fashion” brand, which drops on the market hundreds of new cheaply made items each week, and the greenhouse gas emissions reported in the ESG reports of 2022 and 2023 (which increased of 80% from 2022 to 2023).

GREENWASHING: CURRENT AND FUTURE REGULATION

In the context of a growing consumers’ awareness towards climate change and related issues, regulators are making serious efforts to tackle greenwashing. In fact, by the next couple of years, alleged unreliable and unsubstantiated environmental messages might be condemned under Directive (EU) 2024/825 as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and through better information entered into force on 28 February 2024, but which will be applicable starting from 27 September 2026.

Directive (EU) 2024/825, by amending Directive 2005/29/CE and Directive 2011/83/EU, inserts among misleading actions:

  • any false, untruthful or deceiving information on the environmental characteristics of a product and its circularity aspects, such as durability, reparability or recyclability;
  • making an environmental claim related to future environmental performance without clear, objective, publicly available and verifiable commitments set out in a detailed and realistic implementation plan that includes measurable and time-bound targets and other relevant elements necessary to support its implementation, such as allocation of resources, and that is regularly verified by an independent third party expert, whose findings are made available to consumers;
  • advertising benefits to consumers that are irrelevant and do not result from any feature of the product or business;

and among unfair commercial practices:

  • displaying a sustainability label that is not based on a certification scheme or not established by public authorities;
  • making a generic environmental claim for which the trader is not able to demonstrate recognised excellent environmental performance relevant to the claim;
  • making an environmental claim about the entire product or the trader’s entire business when it concerns only a certain aspect of the product or a specific activity of the trader’s business;
  • claiming, based on the offsetting of greenhouse gas emissions, that a product has a neutral, reduced or positive impact on the environment in terms of greenhouse gas emissions.

In the framework of strategic initiatives and action policies adopted by the European Union on greenwashing and circular economy, Directive (EU) 2024/825 will be complemented by a Directive on Green Claims, which will provide more specific rules on environmental claims. The Directive on Green Claims is still a proposal, but we gave deeper preliminary insights on it here.

THE UK PRECEDENT IN THE FASHION SECTOR

The Italian Authority followed the steps of the British Competition Markets Authority (“CMA”), which earlier this year closed an investigation launched into three major fashion retailers (Asos, Boohoo and Asda) about their eco-friendly claims. The three businesses signed formal agreements to use only accurate, specific and clear green claims. The undertakings are listed here.

Among the changes to look forward from the upcoming review of the 2002 Community Design Regulation (“CDR”), which has been endorsed by the Parliament and awaits formal approval by the Council before entering into force, one lies under Art. 1(126) of the current draft proposal (text available here, state of approval here). Despite not being discussed in the explanatory memorandum, the new Regulation looks to remove the second sentence of Art. 110a(5) CDR, which is currently in force and provides as follows:

“Pursuant to Article 11, a design which has not been made public within the territory of the Community shall not enjoy protection as an unregistered Community design”

This provision was added to the CDR among the many changes made to EU legislation in the context of the Treaty of Accession of the ten countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia – full text here). Since its introduction, it has caused an inconsistency between the making available of unregistered community designs (“UCDs”) for the purposes of obtaining the three-year protection provided upon first disclosure (Art. 11 CDR) and destroying/maintaining novelty, which is required to obtain registered/unregistered design protection in the first place (cf. Art. 11 CDR combined with Articles 4, 5 and 7 CDR).

More specifically, as the law currently stands, first time disclosure outside the EU does not give rise to an unregistered design right (as it would if the same design were disclosed “within the Community”), but does destroy novelty, both for the purposes of later seeking an EU registration and/or obtaining a UCD by subsequently disclosing the design within the EU. While the consequence for obtaining registration is mitigated by the one-year grace period provided under Art. 7(2) CDR, unregistered protection is lost without remedy.

The discrepancy, which has been deemed “protectionist” and in breach of Art. 3(1) TRIPS (national treatment), lies in the fact that – by virtue of Art. 110a(5) CDR – the CDR disregards foreign disclosures for the purposes of awarding unregistered protection, but contains no equivalent provision for preserving novelty. As a result, products launched outside the EU – such as in one of the many trade fairs taking place in Asia, the USA or, following Brexit, the UK – are de facto deprived of unregistered design rights (the novelty of a design disclosed abroad could still be saved if one were able to argue that the design disclosed could not “reasonably have become known in the normal course of business to the circles specialized in the sector concerned, operating within the Community” (Art. 7 CDR). Room for this defence however appears minimal).

Throughout the years, attempts have been made to question the interpretation of Art. 110a(5) CDR to try to fix the issue, unsurprisingly without success. In 2008, the German Federal Court of Justice (“Bundesgerichtshof” – BGH) refused to refer the matter to the CJEU, stating that the wording of Art. 110a(5) CDR left no room for interpretation (cf. decision of 9 October 2008 in case I ZR 126/06 (“Gebäckpresse”), [28]-[30], where the BGH held that an application for registered design in China had destroyed novelty for the purposes of subsequently claiming UCD). The issue was then raised again before HHJ Hacon, in the UK, who referred interpretation of Art. 110a(5) CDR to the CJEU in Beverly Hills Teddy Bear Company v PMS International Group Plc [2019] EWHC 2419 (IPEC) (17 September 2019) – available here. The dispute, which concerned toys first disclosed at a trade fair in Hong Kong, was however settled before the CJEU could provide clarity on the matter (here).

As anticipated, the upcoming Regulation on European Union designs should address this loophole by removing Art. 110a(5) altogether. Notably, a minor inconsistency will remain between the wording regarding disclosure under Art. 7(1) and 11(1) CDR, as the latter will still refer – for unregistered design protection – to making available to the public “within the Community” (but not within “the territory” of the Community, as does Art.110a(5) CDR). The relevance, if any, that the Courts will attribute to this, following reform of the CDR, remains to be seen.

Until then, designers should be mindful of the existing legal framework when planning first disclosure of their next creation, ensuring that they seek registration if they intend to launch their products outside of EU territory (either before they do so or within the one year grace period provided under Art. 7(2) CDR), especially for products that they expect will have significant market potential within the EU.

Image source: https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en

Today more than ever, Europe is focused on sustainable prosperity and competitiveness. Its institutions aim at creating an environment in which businesses can thrive and people can prosper.

It is with this goal ahead that the European Commission tasked Mario Draghi – former President of the European Central Bank and former Italian Prime Minister – to draft a report of his vision of the future of European competitiveness and innovation.

The vast report, available here, deals in the first part with the policies to be adopted in ten major areas of the European economy (energy, critical raw materials, digitalization and advanced technologies, high-speed/capacity broadband networks, computing and AI, semiconductors, energy-intensive industries, clean technologies, automotive, defence, space, pharma and transport). In the second part, the report sets out a number of horizontal policies aimed at accelerating innovation, closing skills gap, sustaining investment, revamping competition and strengthening governance.

In this context, and more specifically in relation to the goal of accelerating innovation, Draghi stressed the need to achieve a more favorable and simpler regulatory ecosystem for innovative companies, underlining repeatedly throughout the report the fundamental role of patents and in general of IP rights protection to sustain innovation. Draghi also noted that the Unitary Patent system is a key tool to achieve such an innovative ecosystem.

In the words of the report, “Fully adopting the Unitary Patent system in all EU Member States would reduce patent application costs, offer broader and uniform territorial protection of IPR for patent holders, and limit litigation uncertainty through the jurisdiction of the Unified Patent Court. To support the uptake of the EU Unitary Patent system and promote the protection of Intellectual Property Rights, training programmes for IPR professionals should be enhanced and possibly subsidized”.

To date, 24 Member States have signed the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA), while only 18 Member States have ratified it (Romania just joined the system on 1 September 2024). Ireland is the likely next country to join, although the referendum necessary for the ratification of the UPCA has been deferred to an unknown date.

The emphasis on the Unified Patent system in Draghi’s report not only reaffirms the willingness of the European institutions to continue to support the new court and to work together with the Member States to ensure the adoption and implementation of the UPCA throughout the EU, but also again confirms the relevance of effective and efficient patent protection for the competitiveness of European businesses.

La Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea si è pronunciata, a gennaio di quest’anno, sul tema della tutela dei diritti esclusivi conferiti dal marchio e, nello specifico, sull’ambito di applicazione dell’uso referenziale del marchio nel settore dei pezzi di ricambio per automobili.

I FATTI DI CAUSA

Il caso concerneva la promozione e commercializzazione di griglie per radiatori, quali pezzi di ricambio non originali per autoveicoli Audi, contenenti un elemento progettato per il fissaggio dell’emblema di Audi la cui forma riproduceva il marchio figurativo di titolarità di Audi stessa.

Lamentando la riproduzione del proprio marchio figurativo su pezzi di ricambio non originali, Audi conveniva in giudizio il venditore delle suddette griglie per radiatori affinché il Tribunale regionale di Varsavia inter alia vietasse la loro pubblicazione, importazione, offerta in vendita e commercializzazione.

Nel contesto di tale procedimento venivano sottoposte alla Corte di Giustizia alcune domande pregiudiziali vertenti sull’estensione del diritto conferito al titolare di un marchio dell’Unione europea di vietare a terzi che operano nel settore dei pezzi di ricambio l’uso nel commercio di un segno identico o simile al proprio marchio.

L’INTERPRETAZIONE DELLA NORMATIVA RILEVANTE OFFERTA DALLA CORTE DI GIUSTIZIA

Ai sensi dell’articolo 9 del Regolamento 2017/1001 (infra, anche solo RMUE), il titolare di un marchio dell’Unione europea gode del diritto esclusivo di vietare a terzi l’uso nel commercio (i) di qualsiasi segno identico al proprio marchio in relazione a prodotti o servizi identici a quelli per i quali il marchio è stato registrato, (ii) di un segno che, a motivo della sua identità o somiglianza con il marchio e dell’identità o somiglianza dei prodotti o servizi contraddistinti da tale marchio e dal segno, possa dare adito a un rischio di confusione per il pubblico, (iii) nonché di un segno identico o simile al marchio, anche per prodotti o servizi non simili a quelli coperti da registrazione, se il marchio gode di notorietà nell’Unione e l’uso del segno senza giusto motivo consente di trarre indebito vantaggio dal carattere distintivo o dalla notorietà del marchio oppure rechi pregiudizio agli stessi.[1]

Secondo la giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia, il suddetto diritto può essere esercitato ove il terzo faccia uso del segno “nel commercio”, vale a dire nel contesto di un’attività commerciale finalizzata a un vantaggio economico[2] , e ove tale uso pregiudichi o possa pregiudicare una o più funzioni del marchio (tra le quali sono annoverate la funzione essenziale di garantire l’identità di origine del prodotto o servizio, la funzione di garanzia della qualità del prodotto o servizio e le funzioni di comunicazione, investimento e pubblicità).

La Corte di Giustizia rileva che nel corso del procedimento a quo è stato accertato (i) che le griglie per radiatori non sono prodotti provenienti dal titolare del marchio e non sono state immesse nel commercio con il suo consenso, (ii) che la forma dell’elemento progettato per il fissaggio dell’emblema di Audi è identica o simile al marchio figurativo di Audi e (iii) che la sua apposizione sulle griglie per radiatori ai fini della loro commercializzazione rappresenta un uso nel commercio del segno.

La Corte prosegue poi la propria analisi constatando che l’elemento per il fissaggio dell’emblema, riproduttivo del marchio di Audi, è collocato sulla griglia per radiatori in modo tale che, fino a quando l’emblema di Audi non è fissato, il segno identico o simile a tale marchio è visibile per il pubblico di riferimento. A parere della Corte, “un fatto del genere è tale da concretizzare l’esistenza di un collegamento materiale tra questo stesso pezzo, che un terzo importa, pubblicizza e propone in vendita, e il titolare del marchio AUDI”.[3]

Ciò detto, nel settore della produzione e commercializzazione dei pezzi di ricambio, occorre conciliare l’interesse alla tutela dei diritti di proprietà industriale (incluso quello di marchio) con la necessità di preservare una concorrenza non falsata tra costruttori di autoveicoli e venditori di pezzi di ricambio non originali, nonché con l’interesse dei consumatori a poter scegliere tra l’acquisto di pezzi di ricambio originali e l’acquisto di pezzi non originali.

Nella legislazione in tema di disegni e modelli, questa esigenza di bilanciamento tra opposti interessi ha tra l’altro portato all’introduzione della cosiddetta clausola di riparazione di cui all’art. 110 del Regolamento 6/2002[4], in virtù della quale è esclusa la protezione quale disegno o modello comunitario per un disegno o modello che costituisca una componente di un prodotto complesso utilizzato allo scopo di consentire la riparazione di tale prodotto complesso al fine di ripristinarne l’aspetto originario. L’ambito di applicazione della suddetta clausola è tuttavia limitato ai soli disegni o modelli comunitari, non contemplando il Regolamento 2017/1001 sul marchio dell’Unione europea alcuna disposizione analoga al suddetto art. 110 ed essendone esclusa l’applicazione per analogia al diritto dei marchi.[5]

Tuttavia, pur ribadendo il principio della stretta applicabilità della clausola di riparazione ai soli disegni o modelli, la Corte di Giustizia chiarisce che ciò non esclude che l’obiettivo di preservare una concorrenza non falsata trovi riconoscimento anche nel settore dei marchi. Rileva a tal fine, per esempio, l’art. 14 RMUE che, in specifiche situazioni ivi espressamente indicate, limita il diritto del titolare di un marchio dell’Unione europea di opporsi all’uso da parte di un terzo di un segno identico o simile a detto marchio.

Tra le circostanze contemplate dall’art. 14 RMUE viene menzionato anche il cosiddetto uso referenziale del marchio, vale a dire l’uso in commercio del marchio per identificare o fare riferimento a prodotti o servizi propri del titolare di tale marchio, specie se tale uso è necessario per contraddistinguere la loro destinazione, in particolare come accessori o pezzi di ricambio (cfr. art. 14, par. 1, lett. c) RMUE). Legittimare l’uso del marchio a fini referenziali significa consentire ai fornitori di prodotti o di servizi complementari a quelli offerti dal titolare di un marchio di utilizzare tale marchio al fine di informare, in modo comprensibile e completo, il pubblico sulla destinazione del prodotto commercializzato o del servizio offerto e quindi “sul nesso utilitaristico esistente tra i loro prodotti o i loro servizi e quelli del suddetto titolare del marchio”.[6]

Ciò premesso, occorre quindi stabilire se l’uso del marchio di Audi sulle griglie per radiatori oggetto del procedimento a quo possa o meno qualificarsi come uso referenziale del marchio altrui.

A parere della Corte di Giustizia, l’uso del marchio figurativo di Audi oggetto del procedimento a quo non può qualificarsi alla stregua di un uso referenziale del marchio, in quanto la scelta della forma dell’elemento progettato per il fissaggio dell’emblema di Audi è guidata dalla volontà di commercializzare una griglia per radiatori che riproduca il più fedelmente possibile quella originale, non dalla necessità reale di contraddistinguere la destinazione del pezzo di ricambio.

In altre parole, l’apposizione sui pezzi di ricambio di un segno che riproduce il marchio figurativo di Audi eccede l’uso a scopo di riferimento nella misura in cui non è finalizzata ad informare i consumatori che detti pezzi di ricambio sono destinati ad essere integrati nei prodotti di Audi. Ed è assolutamente irrilevante che oggetto del presente procedimento sia un elemento di un pezzo di ricambio per autoveicoli, poiché il Regolamento 2017/1001, al contrario della disciplina sul disegno o modello comunitario, non opera alcuna distinzione in base al settore merceologico di riferimento.

CONCLUSIONE

In conclusione, nella misura in cui l’uso di un marchio dell’Unione europea di titolarità altrui non persegue una funzione strettamente identificativa della reale destinazione del prodotto o servizio (unico interesse che trova tutela nell’art. 14, par. 1, lett. c) RMUE), il titolare di tale marchio potrà legittimamente vietare a terzi l’uso nel commercio di un segno identico o simile al proprio marchio, anche ove essi operino nel settore dei pezzi di ricambio.

[1] Cfr. sentenza del 2 aprile 2020, Coty Germany, C‑567/18, EU:C:2020:267, punto 31.

[2] Cfr. sentenza del 12 novembre 2002, Arsenal Football Club, C‑206/01, punto 40; sentenza del 23 marzo 2010, Google France e Google, da C‑236/08 a C‑238/08, EU:C:2010:159, punto 50.

[3] Cit. par. 40 della sentenza in commento, 25 gennaio 2024, Audi, C-334/22, EU:C:2024:76.

[4] Regolamento (CE) n. 6/2002 del Consiglio, del 12 dicembre 2001, su disegni e modelli comunitari.

[5] Cfr. ordinanza del 6 ottobre 2015, Ford Motor Company, C‑500/14, EU:C:2015:680, punti 39, 41 e 42.

[6] Cit. punto 54 della sentenza di commento. Sul punto si vedano anche: sentenza del 17 marzo 2005, Gillette Company e Gillette Group Finland, C‑228/03, EU:C:2005:177, punti 33 e 34; sentenza dell’11 gennaio 2024, Inditex, C‑361/22, EU:C:2024:17, punto 51.

Con decisione del 5 giugno 2024, il Tribunale dell’UE ha fornito importanti chiarimenti sull’uso di un marchio in relazione a specifici prodotti e servizi registrati.

Fatti del procedimento

Nell’aprile 2017 è stata presentata una domanda di decadenza per non uso del marchio UE n. 62638 “BIG MAC” di titolarità di McDonald’s International Property Co. Ltd (“McDonald’s”).

La domanda ha avuto ad oggetto i seguenti prodotti e servizi nelle classi 29, 30 e 42, relativi a vari prodotti alimentari e servizi di ristorazione:

  • Classe 29: Alimenti a base di carne, maiale, pesce e pollame, panini imbottiti a base di carne, panini imbottiti a base di pesce, panini imbottiti a base di carne di maiale, panini imbottiti a base di pollo, frutta e ortaggi conservati e cotti, uova, formaggi, latte, prodotti a base di latte, sottaceti, dolci;
  • Classe 30: Panini imbottiti, panini imbottiti a base di carne, panini imbottiti a base di carne di maiale, panini imbottiti a base di pesce, panini imbottiti a base di pollo, biscotti, pane, dolci, biscotteria, cioccolato, caffè, succedanei del caffè, tè, senape, semola di avena, pasticceria, salse, condimenti, zucchero;
  • Classe 42: Servizi prestati da ristoranti o riguardanti la gestione e il franchising di ristoranti e di altri locali o strutture destinati alla fornitura di cibi e bevande per il consumo e per strutture drive-in; preparazione di alimenti da asporto; progettazione dei suddetti ristoranti, locali e strutture per terzi; pianificazione della costruzione e consulenza per la costruzione di ristoranti per terzi.

L’11 gennaio 2019, la Divisione di Annullamento EUIPO ha accolto la domanda e ha dichiarato decaduti i diritti di McDonald’s in relazione a tutti i summenzionati prodotti e servizi.

Su ricorso di McDonald’s, il 14 dicembre 2022, la Commissione di Ricorso EUIPO ha annullato la decisione della Divisione di Annullamento, ritenendo che le prove fornite da McDonald’s dimostrassero l’estensione dell’uso del marchio contestato per parte dei prodotti e servizi contestati, ossia:

  • Classe 29: Alimenti a base di carne e pollame; panini imbottiti a base di carne; panini imbottiti a base di pollo;
  • Classe 30: Panini imbottiti, panini imbottiti a base di carne, base di pollo;
  • Classe 42: Servizi prestati da ristoranti o riguardanti la gestione e il franchising di ristoranti e di altri locali o strutture destinati alla fornitura di cibi e bevande per il consumo e per strutture drive-in; preparazione di alimenti da asporto.

La decisione della Commissione di Ricorso è stata impugnata dinanzi al Tribunale adducendo che le prove fornite da McDonald’s fossero insufficienti a dimostrare l’uso effettivo del marchio contestato in relazione a

(i) “panini imbottiti a base di pollo” e “alimenti a base di pollame” in Classe 29;

(ii) “alimenti a base di carne” in Classe 29 e “panini imbottiti” in Classe 30;

(ii) i servizi rivendicati in Classe 42 .

La decisione del Tribunale

Nell’esaminare il ricorso e la documentazione presentata nel corso del procedimento, il Tribunale ha ritenuto:

(i) Insufficiente l’uso per “panini imbottiti a base di pollo” e “alimenti a base di pollame”

Le prove depositate da McDonald’s in merito ai “panini imbottiti a base di pollo”, consistenti in stampe di manifesti pubblicitari, screenshot di uno spot televisivo trasmesso in Francia nel 2016 e screenshot dell’account Facebook di McDonald’s Francia del 2016, non fornivano chiare indicazioni sulle quantità, regolarità e ricorrenza della distribuzione dei prodotti, in quanto tali documenti

  • non contenevano alcuna indicazione sui prezzi di vendita di tali prodotti;
  • non contenevano alcuna informazione specifica sui dati di vendita;
  • non contenevano alcuna chiara indicazione della data in cui i manifesti pubblicitari e i pannelli dei menu erano stati diffusi al pubblico o della data di commercializzazione dei prodotti in questione;
  • si riferivano a un solo anno (cioè il 2016).

Il Tribunale ha inoltre ricordato che la decisione della Commissione di Ricorso aveva ritenuto provato l’uso per “alimenti a base di pollame” sulla base della prova dell’uso per “panini imbottiti a base di pollo”. Tenuto conto però che il Tribunale ha ritenuto non provato l’uso per “panini imbottiti a base di pollo”, il Tribunale ha di conseguenza annullato la decisione impugnata con riferimento a “alimenti a base di pollame”.

(ii) Sufficiente l’uso per “alimenti a base di carne” e “panini imbottiti”

Ritenuto che McDonald’s ha fornito la prova dell’uso effettivo del marchio contestato in relazione ai “panini imbottiti a base di carne”, il Tribunale ha considerato provato l’uso anche per “alimenti a base di carne” e “panini imbottiti”. Il Tribunale ha infatti ritenuto che tali categorie di prodotti non potessero essere suddivise in ulteriori sottocategorie, non costituendo una categoria di prodotti sufficientemente ampia e avendo il medesimo uso o scopo, trattandosi di alimenti contenenti carne, destinati a essere consumati e a soddisfare esigenze nutrizionali specifiche.

(iii) Insufficiente l’uso per i servizi in Classe 42

Il Tribunale ha riconosciuto che la decisione della Commissione di Ricorso aveva commesso un errore di valutazione nell’interpretare i servizi registrati come servizi di ristorazione (fast-food) per fornire alimenti e bevande ai clienti, in quanto:

  • “il significato letterale dei termini che compongono i servizi interessati non si riferisce alla nozione di servizi di ristorazione nell’ambito dei quali prodotti alimentari e prodotti bevande verrebbero forniti ai clienti, ma per supportare servizi destinati ai professionisti della ristorazione, come i servizi relativi alla gestione o al funzionamento di un ristorante, poiché si tratta, da un lato, di servizi forniti o legati alla gestione di ristoranti e altri esercizi o infrastrutture di questo tipo e, dall’altro, di servizi legati alla preparazione di cibi da asporto”

Tanto premesso, il Tribunale, dopo aver esaminato gli elementi di prova presentati da McDonald’s, ossia

  • fotografie delle confezioni utilizzate per panini a base di carne;
  • fotografie di brochure promozionali;
  • schermate dei siti web e dell’account Facebook di McDonald’s;
  • screenshot di spot televisivi e di video su YouTube;
  • fotografie di menu utilizzati nei ristoranti McDonald’s;
  • sondaggi;
  • articoli di giornali e riviste ed estratti di articoli dell’enciclopedia online Wikipedia;
  • una lettera del Direttore Generale di un’associazione tedesca di datori di lavoro e di categoria nel settore delle catene di ristorante;

ha ritenuto che nessuno di tali elementi di prova si riferisse ai servizi in questione, anche se intesi come servizi di fast-food, provando che il marchio è utilizzato esclusivamente in relazione a “panini a base di carne”. Pertanto, a giudizio del Tribunale, le prove non dimostrano un uso effettivo per i servizi di ristorazione rivendicati (ossia “servizi prestati da ristoranti o riguardanti la gestione e il franchising di ristoranti e di altri locali o strutture destinati alla fornitura di cibi e bevande per il consumo e per strutture drive-in; preparazione di alimenti da asporto”).

Alla luce di quanto precede, il Tribunale ha parzialmente accolto il ricorso, con ciò confermando che la portata della prova d’uso su determinati prodotti e servizi non può essere estesa a prodotti e servizi che, per quanto affini, non sono strettamente coperti dalla prova.